Looking back, moving forward

With the year drawing to a close, it's often customary for individuals, organizations, bloggers, etc. to compile lists -- lists which, in their view, somehow encapsulate the passing year. Admittedly I have no such list to offer, though would like to draw your attention to a few rather worthwhile compilations. While not quite of the 'year in review' variety, I believe they actually say more than any such list would.

• Arguably most interesting is Elizabeth Dickinson's post in Foreign Policy which examines what the leaked US diplomatic cables reveal about the world's rogue states. Dickinson conveniently breaks down the information into 'what we know' and 'what we learn,' with a few 'curve balls' thrown in for good measure. A most fascinating read.
• Russell Leigh Moses of the WSJ points us to the top China political trends to watch in 2011, which say much about what transpired in 2010
• In a similar vein, Reuters has compiled what they believe will be the leading global political risk trends for 2011 (all links are pdf), broken down regionally: Global risks/trends; Western Europe; Emerging Europe; Africa; Middle East; Latin America; United States

It is also incumbent upon me to call your attention to a new expert blog, written by the Council on Foreign Relation's senior fellow for Africa policy studies, Ambassador John Campbell. In 'Africa in Transition,' Campbell examines political and security developments in sub-Saharan Africa in a most astute fashion. Though much of the posting tends to focus on Nigeria in particular, there is much fascinating insight to be garnered.

And with that I wish you all the best for the coming New Year. May 2011 be kind to us all!

Noteworthy...

Conflict leads to state-building? The curious case of Kenya

Much of the over-hyped China rhetoric emanating from Washington is disregarding a crucial element of the story: China's strong import levels

Chinese and Indian defense planning, compared

Zambian views on Chinese firms from Zambian Trade Minister, Felix Mutati

The comeback kid

It truly is embarrassing, this unintended hiatus I've taken from posting here. Over the past several months I on occasion vowed to myself to "get back to it next week," but - as is plainly evident - with little success. I do wish I could proffer an explanation for my absence, but I must confess that there isn't one worthy of mention. Whatever the case, I've returned with high hope and intention to be more diligent in my writings on this space; indeed, there is much about which to write.

The past few months have been spent refining and focusing on my PhD dissertation which, I'm quite pleased to say, is slowly beginning to take form. My research has shifted slightly from its previous focus on Chinese entrepreneurs in East Africa (though this still very much informs my work), to asking broader questions of the geo-strategic sort - in the context of Sino-Ethiopian relations in particular. In the course of my research I have admittedly grown rather frustrated with the emergent body of literature on China-Africa relations, consisting as it does of the same themes repeated over and over and over again. There's a song out these days by Iyaz, an allegedly up-and-coming young rapper, entitled "Replay;" part of the song's refrain goes: "It's like my iPod stuck on replay, replay-ay-ay-ay....". Most applicable to literature on Sino-African relations, unfortunately.

It's not the the literature is bad per se, but rather that in both asking the same questions and in treating China's forays into Africa an an international anomaly unseen in any other time or place we are, I think, asking the wrong questions. We need to take a step back, I believe, and look at the big picture: the Chinese aren't the only investors in Africa; what else is going on? How do all of these intersection points of agency stand to influence the continent? And influence in what way? Politically? Socially? Economically? What about China? How does Africa fit into China's grand strategy? What is that strategy? Who's strategy? And on the African side of things, too, where is the agency? What are the key strategic interests? How does China fit into Africa's strategy and the strategies of its constituent member states? By asking these (and indeed other) questions the phenomenon known as "China in Africa" is seemingly removed from the vacuum in which it has hitherto been resident and begins to take on new and exciting dimensions. Indeed, we all know that China seeks Africa's resources - and Africa in turn China's investment. There is, however, more to the story.

Relatedly (or perhaps not), together with a friend and colleague, I've published a paper as part of Afrobarometer's Working Paper Series. The paper focuses on African perceptions of the bourgeoning Chinese presence in the continent, further deciphering the factors informing the views held. The full paper may be found here. I will leave it to you to decide in which category of writing it should be placed.

Where have all the (good) African leaders gone?

It would seem that there are no worthwhile (past) African leaders in the entirety of Africa.

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, established on the premise of improving the quality of governance across the continent, has for the past several years awarded the African Leadership Prize to previous leaders who have done well to support the cause of good governance in their respective countries. This year no such prize was awarded. While Ibrahim claims that there are "no issues of disrespect" surrounding the decision, it nevertheless comes as quite a low blow, especially to the likes of Mbeki and Kufour who - while no doubt boasting highly dubious governance records - were the likely contenders.

Aside from a nice pat on the back, however, the effectiveness of the prize (if the conferring of a prize can indeed be effective) is questionable. The general idea underpinning the award is that by singling out previous statesmen who supported democracy, the rule of law, and all other such things that have come to be lumped under the general notion of 'governance,' sitting leaders will be encouraged to act similarly. Yet, as the BBC rightly points out, this doesn't at all seem to be the case:

Uganda, Chad and Cameroon have all changed their constitutions so their leaders can retain their positions.

There have been coups in Guinea, Mauritania and Madagascar, as well as several elections that fell well short of international standards. And the countries that have received most praise from Mo Ibrahim's foundation this year - Mauritius, Cape Verde and Seychelles - are far from the continent's centres of power.

That being said, perhaps withholding the prize this year sends a different, much more apt message: work harder.

Noteworthy...

Hello (!), and thanks very much for being so patient while I transitioned back to an Oxonian existence. I'm nearly all settled and on something resembling a routine, which is quite exciting. Research productivity is still a matter to be tackled, but I'm getting there... slowly, slowly.

News while I was away? - Lots, really! Below is a little collection of stories which caught my attention when I finally sat down to catch-up on the world's goings-on. These are but several among many, to be sure:

• Owen Barder on when innovative finance is good for development - and when it isn't
• Despite China's rapid economic rebound in recent months, many Chinese companies are still operating at a lower level of activity than they had achieved in the boom years
• American chicken feet may be the US's saving grace in its recent (and ongoing) trade war with China
• Nestle is in a bit of a bind as it has been discovered that the company purchases milk from a Zimbabwean farm seized from its white owners and now owned by Mugabe's wife. Now that's a "whoops" moment if I ever saw one...
• The 24 September edition of the Economist had a wonderful special report on the positive potential of mobile money in Africa
• Writing in the European Voice, Jonathan Holslag and Gustaaf Geeraerts argue that Europe should expect to see a more assertive China in the coming years
• A rather biting review of Paul Collier's book, Wars, Guns & Votes written by Dr. Mutuma Ruteere, Research Fellow at the University of Cape Town. The review is written from an anti-imperialist, anti-interventionist tone; certainly worth your time

Noteworthy...

Posting here will likely be light(-ish) through the end of this month, as I'm currently in the process of moving back to Oxford after a year-long hiatus. As you might imagine, things are rather hectic, and I imagine that they will remain as such until I'm properly settled in the city of dreaming spires come the end of September/early October. Please do bear with me!

For now, some very noteworthy reads (now bulleted for your reading pleasure owing to their number. Slightly more optically pleasing, no?):

• Protests have again broken out in Urumqi, the capital of China's Xinjiang province, two months after the initial turmoil. Thousands of Han Chinese have taken to the street touting the "uselessness" of the government and its failure to provide appropriate security protections in the region
• John Prendergast, co-chair of the ENOUGH Project, discusses the flaws in the Obama administration's Sudan policy and what should be done to remedy them. Mark Goldberg was right: Darfur activists appear to be losing their patience
• Gmail was down for a while this week, and it seems that the world nearly stood still. Why do we freak out over such seemingly insignificant technical glitches?
• It's no secret that the Chinese cook their books. What's perhaps less well known is that the cooking is done not by central CCP bureaucrats, but by local and provincial government officials. Such a reality speaks to the complexities of center-periphery relations in the country
• Is Kenya falling apart? It certainly appears that way, especially with the Kenyan state growing increasingly less visible and less relevant
• One-third of Chinese scientists want to switch careers and wouldn't recommend their profession to their children. Too little pay, too much work
• While I'm certainly no expert on Honduran politics, I nevertheless find it rather curious that the U.S. is threatening not to recognize the results of the Honduran elections to be held this November. This decision is based on the "current existing conditions" in the country, which have deteriorated since the June 28 coup. If this is indeed the sole guiding motive, surely the U.S. should not have recognized the Iranian election results either?
• Via Texas in Africa I learn of a brilliant series being run by Myles Estey over at The Esteyonage. The series, 'Gettin by,' looks at the micro-economy of Liberia and the means by which people outside the national statistics make a living. While the focus in solely on Liberia, the findings are indubitably applicable to other African states as well
• Amartya Sen's new book, The Idea of Justice, is 490-some pages of wise Sen-isms. Two themes predominate: economic rationality and social injustice. Occasional swings at John Rawls are also taken, which (depending on your guiding philosophy) make the book both witty and exceptionally informative. The Economist's review of the book may be found here

On China's burgeoning relationship with Francophone Africa and oil-for-infrastructure contracts

The July issue of The China Monitor - a publication of the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch - is focused exclusively on the relationship between China and Francophone Africa. I find the focus most interesting, as it seems to suggest that the colonial history of African nations in some way affects the nature of China's engagement with them. Is China's engagement with Francophone Africa different, then, from its engagement with English Africa? Or Portuguese Africa? I admittedly hadn't given such a possibility much previous thought, but it is a hypothesis worth exploring.

Page 7 of this issue also features a piece by a colleague of mine, Dunia P. Zongwe, in which he interestingly writes on China's ore-for-infrastructure contracts, and the economic complementarities between China and Africa. The crux of Dunia's argument suggests that:

[...] the terms of economic exchanges in the mining sector between China and resource-rich African countries should assume, whenever possible, a R4I [resource for infrastructure] form.

In their essence, R4I contracts mirror contrat d'echange (exchange contracts), which do not involve any direct transfer of money to host governments, thereby reducing the risk that governments will mishandle investments. According to Dunia, such contracts carry further positive distributive outcomes, as African countries are able to retain and spread more widely the benefits of FDI than under traditional investment contracts. Such positive externalities are visible in Angola, which was recently lauded for its effectiveness in managing Chinese investment.

The Angolan case indeed seems to suggest that R4I contracts may be a valuable tool by which to optimize China's FDI in Africa if managed accordingly. The case further does well to bring African governance back into the equation; ultimately it is up to African governments to devise appropriate investment policies which optimize Chinese FDI and assist in developing the state and economy. The Chinese are making their moves, and African leaders must make theirs.

Thank you for your message... again

The CS Monitor has compiled a most noteworthy map of sorts detailing the content of Hilary Clinton's message on her recent trip to Africa. The image accompanies a great piece by CS contributor Tracey Samuelson from which we learn that, well, American politicians quite generally have very little to say to their African counterparts, having instead opted to master the art of recycling messages that have been touted since the 1970s - or thereabouts (Ms. Samuelson does not mention this point; I have noted it here to stress the general absurdity and lack of a U.S. policy towards Africa).

Honestly, what's the point of undertaking an extensive African tour if the message will more or less be the same across the board? Presumably it's much more efficient to go to one country, get all the points out and instruct all other African governments to "See [insert country here] for message."* Based on the CS Monitor's map, a simple trip to Angola would have more or less done the trick:

Now don't misunderstand me, the vast majority of the issues Secretary Clinton brought up are quite worthwhile and indeed applicable in the contexts in which they were raised. Yes, of course we must discuss HIV/AIDS in South Africa and the security crisis in Kenya. And given that Angolan oil exports are of particularly great importance to U.S. strategic interests, the trade terms surrounding them must also enter into discussion. I'm not at all suggesting that her rhetoric was necessarily wrong, only that it was quite generally meaningless and did absolutely nothing to carve out an American policy towards the continent. Blanket statements are fine and dandy for a time, but at a certain point it becomes necessary to delve into the nitty gritty details of policy. Well, we are well beyond that point and seemingly no such efforts are being made - not by the U.S. at least; the Chinese have been on point for quite some time now.

* I am, of course, being completely facetious in suggesting such a thing and strongly favor a much more nuanced U.S. policy towards Africa. Unfortunately, few in State have yet to catch on to this novel idea...

Whither America's Africa policy? No, seriously. Where is it?

I really can do no better today than to direct you to Shashank's well thought out post in which he concludes:

After seven months, a presidential visit and now this major trip, it's still unclear what the Obama administration wants to do differently in Africa. The most important U.S. agency that works on Africa, USAID, still has no leader. Clinton's trip was full of the same hopeful but canned rhetoric about "good governance," "food security" and "helping Africans help themselves." Folks who care about Africa hardly expect the continent to be the Obama administration's No. 1 foreign policy priority. But they will be disappointed with this trip.

Not only is it disappointing, but it's actually quite laughable - and not in a joyous laughter sort of way. I really don't understand how anyone is meant to take US policy towards Africa (the presently non-existent policy, mind you) seriously when the country's own Secretary of State makes such ridiculous statements as her proposal for camcorders in the Congo, and her lending of support to Somalia's Sheik Sharif - evidently unaware of the consequences - among others. Her utterly distasteful outburst in the Congo doesn't do much to bolster her, or American, credibility either (surely there was a classier, more professional way of handling the matter, even if it upset you, Madame Secretary), and neither does her outlandish comparison of the 2000 Florida recount to Nigeria's rigged elections. I am terribly sorry to discover that she is still seemingly bitter over the matter, but drawing such faulty moral equivalences jeopardizes the advance of democracy in countries like Nigeria and others across Africa where corruption is rampant. To draw my own comparison, the ridiculousness implicit in such a statement is tantamount to that which would compare women's rights in, say, Sierra Leone - the worst place in Africa to be a woman according to the 2008 UN Human Development Report - to those in the United States. Think on that.

While Secretary Clinton may be dancing away across the continent, the U.S. missed a prime opportunity to seriously engage with African leaders on matters of trade, foreign assistance, human rights - heck, even the objectives behind AFRICOM - and other matters of actual consequence to the continent. It's little wonder that African leaders are more seriously engaging with the Chinese as regards their countries' needs and policies. I probably would, too.

Over-exaggerated Asian scrambles and praise-worthy Angolan management on a Monday morning

Chatham House released a new report today which provides a comparative study of the impact of Asian oil companies on Nigeria and Angola - the two leading oil-producing companies in sub-Saharan Africa. While the report considers Indian, South Korean and Japanese national oil companies, the primary focus is on Chinese oil strategy. Specifically, the report considers why Chinese oil strategy has been - and remains - so successful; how it is that Angola emerged as the second largest supplier of oil to China in 2008; how Chinese companies negotiate deals; and how such deals benefit Angola and Nigeria, respectively.

Among the more interesting findings emanating from the report is that which suggests that Angola does not fit the stereotype of a weak African state being exploited by the resource-hungry Chinese. Indeed, the Angolan government has been quite successful in managing its relationships with China and its oil companies, as well as handling its own version of the oil-for infrastructure scheme. The case of Angola is contrasted with Nigeria, where the Obasanjo government largely failed to manage the scheme:

While Nigeria was playing politics with its Asian partners, Angola was driven by economic necessity to quickly access funds to finance its reconstruction [...]

[...] The scale of corruption, mismanagement and non-execution of projects in the Obasanjo years has sent shockwaves through Nigeria. [...] His intentions were good but officials failed to spell out the full implications of the scheme. And many used the scheme for private profit.

The report further suggests that Western fears about an Asian takeover in the Nigerian and Angolan oil sectors are highly exaggerated:

Except for Japan, [Asian oil companies] only acquired equity participation in both countries in the last five years. More important, the [western] oil majors remain the leading players in both countries. They dominate production and hold the majority of reserves.

While Western oil companies do, indeed, still own much of Africa's oil reserves, the Chinese scramble for African soil should not be downplayed. As the report itself notes, Angola is now the second largest supplier of oil to China, with Nigeria, the Congo, Kenya, and other oil-producing states not too far behind. In 2005, China imported nearly 701,000 bpd of oil from Africa - approximately 30% of its total oil imports. This figure has been rising in recent years, and is estimated to reach some 40-50% in the next decade.

The full report - Thirst for African Oil: National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola - may be found here.

On IR theory and the African challenge

Via Ryan C. Briggs I happened across a great site - Theory Talks - which serves as an interactive forum for discussion of debates in IR (international relations) with especial emphasis on the underlying theoretical issues. If you're like me, teasing out the appropriate theoretical framework for one's work is often the most challenging part of any research project, which is why I greatly appreciate what Theory Talks is trying to do. While the site certainly won't help to sort a framework for individual projects, it does present interesting perspectives and raise fascinating debates on issues surrounding the ever-evolving discipline that is IR.

Among the more curious "talks" I found (and there are quite a few!) is that by Kevin C. Dunn, visiting professor at Mbarara University in Uganda, who has written extensively on African politics with especial focus on the Congo. Dunn argues that images of countries (like the Congo, for instance) are often social constructions, which renders field work for the "white man" a very biased field, indeed:

The identity of the Congo, like other social identities, has been formed by being located within the narratives that we use to know, understand, and make sense of the social world. Narratives of national identities are formed by a gradual layering on and connecting of events and meanings, usually through three steps: the selection of events themselves, the linking of these events to each other in causal and associational ways (plotting), and interpreting what the events and plots signify. The example of the Congo is illuminating because it shows how these identity-constructing narratives are rarely the exclusive product of a state’s policy makers. External forces are constantly at play, seeking to select, plot and interpret the events and meanings by which identities are narrated.

The central thesis of Dunn's talk is that IR scholars are political actors as much as the phenomena they study. Being as such, it is inevitable that their research and findings are biased based on their constructed perceptions of their respective subject matters. Such bias, Dunn argues, is particularly pronounced in research focused on Africa, much of which is approached from a North American/Western European perspective where an idealized North American/Western European state is taken as the norm. Dunn's is an interesting discussion, and certainly one worth reading for any IR scholars with a focus on Africa.

For all African-centric theoretical debates see here.

Africa does not need more hot air

I must admit that I've been rather disappointed with the present US administration's policies towards Africa. To be perfectly frank, I was much happier with America's African policies under Bush (*gasp* yes, I said it), with few exceptions (AFRICOM, which I have spoken about in the past) is indubitably one of them. What Bush tried to do - and was moderately successful in achieving - was positively engaging with the continent: increasing development assistance where needed, introducing programs to reduce the burden of AIDS and malaria, AGOA, working to secure a peace deal between north and south Sudan in 2005, etc. His policies weren't perfect - many were seriously flawed - but there appeared to be a genuine sense of engagement and interest. Whether that was driven by humanitarian goodwill or geopolitical interests I will leave for you to decide; the point is that the US appeared to be active in creating opportunity for Africans. In short, they not only talked the talk, but walked the walk.

Not only does the Obama administration appear disinterested, but it is seemingly failing to capitalize on opportunities where they exist. I bring this up because Hilary Clinton is presently in Africa. Like many others, I am following the news hoping to discover something - anything - of substance (indeed, something to blog about!), but am seemingly failing in this endeavor (if someone has managed to stumble upon anything worthwhile pertaining to Clinton's time in Africa, do please send it my way). Her rhetoric - much like President Obama's in Ghana earlier this year - is filled with the same empty jargon uttered by Western politicians of yore. Yes, Kenya needs to reform; and yes, we all know that the continent has "enormous potential for progress;" and we all understand the importance of stability in Somalia. Blah, blah, blah. By the by, overemphasizing agricultural policy to the neglect of manufacturing and entrepreneurship does little to foster sustainable development across the continent. And publicly making promises to Somalia's Sheik Sharif is tantamount to wishing death upon his administration. While I do understand that the trip was all quite last minute, there are some things on which a Secretary of State must absolutely be briefed.

While I do further realize that Africa isn't much of a priority for the US government at present (a grave flaw, indeed, given especially China's growing influence across the continent!) and is constrained by the financial crisis and domestic politics, there are things the administration can do besides simply blowing about hot air: increasing diplomacy with leading economies, improving foreign assistance and trade, and being actively involved in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, are foremost among them. Indeed, if the United States seeks genuine relations with African nations, it is in the interest of both parties to move beyond the one-dimensional quality that characterizes them today. One of my favorite bloggers, Texas in Africa, has an absolutely brilliant open letter to Secretary Clinton posted today in which she stresses precisely this point, and goes even further to suggest how the US might actively work to aid the continent. The post is focused primarily on the Congo, but several of the points are indeed quite applicable elsewhere around the continent. Its message even more so.

Where do I sign?

[image: the NYTimes]

Uncle Sam's African footprint

This week's issue of The New Statesman has a curious map tracking America's 'military footprint' around the world (i.e. the global distribution of American military bases):

From the map it is quite clear that the majority of U.S. bases are found in parts of Europe and the Middle East. In Africa, bases are located in Algeria, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda. Many of these countries were considered for the home of AFRICOM, the US-Africa military command established under Bush (Esquire, of all places, had a great piece on the Africa Command programme back in 2007. Certainly worth a read!)

Many African states have been - and remain - quite vocal over their displeasure with the presence of such bases, maintaining that they constitute a direct violation of their sovereignty. Equally so, other states appear quite enthused to garner the assistance of the United States military in dealing with various regional issues. While I do certainly have my opinions on the matter, none are yet fixed in stone. What are your thoughts on U.S. military presence in Africa?

Show us the money (for health) !!

Namibia-based AIDS activist group, AIDS & Rights Alliance for Southern Africa, has compiled a creative video campaign to bring attention to the seemingly forgotten 2001 pledge made by African leaders to devote 15% of their national budgets to healthcare. Eight years later, nearly all countries have failed to meet this target.

The ARASA video, "Lords of the Bling (Vol. 1)" (funny because it's true, I suppose!) depicts the amount of treatment that could be paid for with the amount of money spent on extravagant purchases and events by the continent's political leaders. The figures are absolutely startling:

[HT: Shashank Bengali]

Noteworthy….

China cracks down on civil society, making a case of the Open Constitution Initiative (OCI)

A coffee shortage in Venezuela? (Evidently I can't seem to leave the coffee theme from last week. Apologies.)

Who stereotyped whom? A different perspective on the 'Gates-Gate' controversy

On crime, security and corruption in Africa; new findings from Enterprise Surveys

Diplomacy 101 from Joe Biden. Quite frankly, it just makes me want to cry (and not tears of joy, mind you!)

Finance in Africa: Looking backwards to move forward

Via VoxEU, Thorsten Beck, Michael Fuchs and Marilou Uy argue that Africa's financial stakeholders - bankers, donors and policymakers - must take the lead in implementing financial sector reforms in a way that maximizes Africa's opportunities:

Although the direct impact of the current crisis in the US and Europe on African financial systems is relatively contained – given that African banks are not as closely integrated in the global financial system as other regions of the developing world and hold most of their assets and commitments on rather than off the balance sheet – indirect effects through reduced real economic activity and reduced private capital inflows caused by reduced risk appetite might very well have negative repercussions for the real and financial sectors in Africa. Critically, the current crisis has put the debate on the appropriate role of government in the financial sector and the benefits and pitfalls of globalisation on policymakers’ agenda again. We will argue that it is important to study carefully past experience both in the region and other parts of the developing and developed world.

Beck et. al briefly expound on various approaches to the role of government in Africa's financial sectors - from activist to modernist, market-developing and market-enabling - and further explore the challenges and opportunities brought with the integration of African banks into international financial markets. Little is offered in the way of policy advice, other than to say that the strains placed on African markets as a consequence of the global market call for "further institution building as well as cautious and context-specific government intervention to help financial market participants expand financial services to the frontier of commercially sustainable possibilities." Yes: Quite right.

Lending a new meaning to the term "south-south cooperation"

David Axe of the War is Boring blog has a column in Wednesday's World Politics Review in which he suggests that Kenya might be funneling arms to South Sudan. Excellent. Well done, Kenya (of course I say this with complete and utter sarcasm).

According to Axe, the Ukrainian-owned vessel, Fania, which was captured by Somali pirates and returned to the port in Mombassa in February, was bound for the breakaway region in southern Sudan. The ship carried 33 Soviet-designed T-72 main battle tanks, plus other arms and ammunition - all of somewhat dodgy origin and ownership:

The Faina shipment apparently represented the third and final installment of a large batch of heavy weaponry for South Sudan, sourced from Ukraine and brokered by Nairobi. In November, the German magazine Der Spiegel claimed it had records proving an earlier shipment of 42 tanks that had largely escaped international scrutiny [...]

If this is indeed discovered to be true, it "would finger the Kenyan government in a sanctions-skirting arms race that some worry could result in another bloody civil warfare in Sudan." Kenyan military support for South Sudan would also put Nairobi at great odds with the U.S., which is one of the country's closest allies.

The Stop Arms to Sudan program of Human Rights First has a database of various countries' arms sales to Sudan between 2004-2006 (if anyone happens upon an updated version, do please let me know!). Not surprisingly, China is the foremost supplier of arms, but if you scroll down a ways you see that Kenya has done its fair share as well. The database is a conservative estimate at best as the data collected is that which the countries have divulged voluntarily (*chuckle chuckle*). The database also fails to specify where in Sudan the arms are being shipped, though it really isn't too difficult to guess.

Perhaps it is somewhat foolish to single out Kenya in such a way, as it is highly plausible that other African states are engaged in similar antics, though perhaps do a better job of remaining under the radar. At the same time, the outing of the Kenya-South Sudan relationship may perhaps do well to serve as a warning to other African countries embroiled in similar engagements. A comment by an Economist reader puts the matter in plain terms: "Kenyan Govt is fishing in a muddy waters. Beware what you do in the neighborhood."

On China as Africa's biggest arms dealer

I'm currently working on a paper examining Sino-Zambian relations, focusing especially on Chinese activity in Zambia's mining sector. I've been sitting on this project for quite some time, and finally managed to overcome what had been a most serious case of writer's block with the help of a lovely glass of Bandol (Tempier). Ok, fine, two glasses. In any event, while doing a bit of extra desk research, I happened upon an interesting piece in the recent edition of the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief. Author Richard Bitzinger writes:

China is now, on average, the world’s fifth largest arms exporter, after the traditional leading suppliers: the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. In fact, in 2007 it was fourth in terms of global arms transfer agreements, ahead of France, Germany and Spain.

Nearly all of China’s arms transfers are to developing countries, and in this arena the Chinese defense industry is emerging as a formidable competitor. In fact, China ranked third in terms of arms deliveries to the developing world in 2007. China's largest markets are in Asia, the Middle East, and particularly Africa. In fact, during the period 2004-2007, China was the single largest seller of arms to Africa; and its major customers include Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

Leading Chinese weapons exports (to Africa) include:

• The K-8 trainer jet: China has exported nearly 250 of these lightweight trainer/attack jets since 2000, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on arms transfers. Its biggest client has been Egypt, which bought 120 K-8s, most of which were assembled locally from kits, between 2001 and 2008. Other customers include Ghana, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, while Venezuela is in negotiations to purchase up to 24 K-8s.
• The F-7MG fighter jet: This aircraft is the export version of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force’s F-7E, itself an upgraded adaptation of the MiG-21. The F-7MG features a larger wing and, reportedly, a British radar. China has sold more than a hundred of these fighters to Bangladesh, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, according the SIPRI Arms Transfers database, since the mid-1990s.
• The WZ-551 armored personnel carrier: Although not a particularly high-tech system, the WZ-551 is notable for being sold widely around the world, including countries like Argentina, Gabon, Kenya, Kuwait, Nepal, Oman, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tanzania

It remains difficult to gauge how successful China will be in the global arms marketplace, with countries like the U.S. and Russia out-exporting the country by rather wide margins (in 2007, for example, Russia exported $4.6 billion worth of arms - four times as much as China. Even Germany out-exported China by 60%). Yet China's foothold in the African marketplace appears to be quite favorable. In Zambia, for instance, China's North Industries Corp. (NORINCO) is allegedly in talks to upgrade Zambia's T-59 tanks engines, armor and fire control systems. The Nigerian air force has been eyeing China's K-8 trainer aircraft (Nigeria imported Chinese J-7 fighters in 2006). Zimbabwe is equipped with Chinese K-8 trainers and J-7 fighters, and in early 2009 was negotiating the purchase of one squadron of FC-1 fighters from. Chinese arms now equip Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Kenya... the list goes on and on.

Chinese arms deals appear to be part and parcel of the "oil-for-infrastructure" deals China continues to strike across the continent. In Angola, for instance, arms are sold in exchange for the country's oil. In Zambia, copper is the currency of choice. While some argue that Chinese arms sales to Africa will drop once China acquires a satisfactory supply of natural resources, such claims are highly dubious. What constitutes a "satisfactory supply" for a country with massive energy demands? What's more, it's rather doubtful that China will be so foolish as to bypass a booming export market. If nothing else, the Chinese are exceptionally savvy businessmen, and arms sales to Africa is a brilliant business opportunity. While China may not be supplanting or joining the U.S. and European states as a large supplier of sophisticated arms on a global scale anytime soon, they have seemingly already done so - and continue to do so - in Africa.

Noteworthy….

Bansky, the British street artist, has left his mark on the African continent. This Flickr page has a wonderful collection of his images which highlight Western perceptions of Africa

China is now an empire in denial, according to the FT's Gideon Rachman

Kindles, iPods and the end of cultural snobbery? Oh dear, this can't possibly be good.

Starbucks has opened an office in Kigali, Rwanda, and is set to partner with local coffee farmers. I wonder if this means that I can get my sugar-free vanilla soy latté fix next time I'm in Rwanda?

According to this projection, China will be the second most populous country in the world by 2050 (it is currently first), followed by the U.S. and Nigeria. India will be the foremost populous, while the Congo will be ninth-most.

Humming a familiar tune

Barack Obama delivererd his speech to Ghana's Parliament this past Saturday (full text of the speech may be found here) in what was his first presidential trip to sub-Saharan Africa. A collection of opinions on the speech may be found at the BBC's fantastic 'Africa Have Your Say' program.

What I have to say is this: While there is little denying the significance of Obama's trip or the importance of his now oft-repeated statement that "Africa's future is up to Africans," the content of his speech was altogether unsurprising and contained nothing that hasn't already been said. Like other Western leaders who have addressed African nations in the past, Obama came touting the need for Africans to embrace democracy and market capitalism; to battle corruption, cease the ongoing violence, work with the West to combat disease and - in short - embrace the 21st century. This is all well and good, but such catch-phrases amount to no more than empty suits when not substantiated with specifics. Even his claim that Africa's future rests with its own people has been made numerous times in the past; most recently by the likes of Bill Easterly, President Kagame of Rwanda, and Dambisa Moyo in her ever-controversial book Dead Aid.

There was a welcomed shift in tone when Obama promised to cut down on funding American consultants and administrators and instead put resources and training into the hands of those who need them (i.e. resident Africans), as well as when he highlighted the economic possibilities implicit in African entrepreneurship (which, again, Kagame has been stressing for some time). But overall the speech diverged little from previous U.S. policy statements on Africa, no less so given Obama's insistence on continuing Bush's terrible idea of Africa Command. As Bill Easterly aptly notes in today's post, "[...] goodwill for U.S. military is nonexistent after a long history of Cold War Africa interventions, post-Cold War fumbles, reinforced by the more recent fiascos of Iraq and Afghanistan. Africans will never see US military (or any other Western force) as a neutral and benevolent force." *Sigh* When will we learn?

Of course the speech was inspirational - as may of President Obama's speeches are - and quite empowering for many Africans (and, apparently, for the UK Times' Libby Purves who sees a fantastic "new start" where those who understand African history and politics see none). Yet it pales in comparison to the speech Obama gave in Cairo when he addressed the Islamic world, and fails to represent much in the way of a novel shift in U.S. policy towards Africa and its people. Yes, Africans must pull themselves up by their bootstraps if they are to make anything of themselves, but didn't we (and they) know that already?