A market for aid?

In his new essay on aid, Owen Barder argues that policies to improve aid have - and continue to - rely too much on a planning paradigm that attempts to ignore, rather than change, the political economy of aid:

It is tempting to conclude that the answer is for donors to defer to the leadership of developing country governments, especially given the commitments to this in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. But that assumes away the problem. The balance of power between donors and recipients converges on an equilibrium which balances the various interests of the givers and receivers of aid, and the implementing agents. If we find this equilibrium unsatisfactory, we have to change the determinants of the equilibrium, not simply try to move away from it.

Barder posits a combination of market mechanisms, networked collaboration and collective regulation as more likely to herald the desired results than the hitherto pursued policy approaches. Such coordination, he argues, can improve accountability, reduce information asymmetries, and reduce principal-agent problems currently faced by donor agencies. In so doing, they can help to change the political economy of aid, and so move the political equilibrium.

Arguably Barder's most controversial suggestion is the unbundling of funding from aid management to create more explicit markets for aid delivery. What this means in practice is opening up contracts to competition among a range of aid delivery agencies, both public and private. Such competition could lead to greater specialisation and division of labour, incentives to define and measure results, etc.

The UNDP (among countless such aid agencies, to be sure!) must be reeling. What are your thoughts?

(PS. For more from Owen have a look at his blog, found here)

Noteworthy...

Hello (!), and thanks very much for being so patient while I transitioned back to an Oxonian existence. I'm nearly all settled and on something resembling a routine, which is quite exciting. Research productivity is still a matter to be tackled, but I'm getting there... slowly, slowly.

News while I was away? - Lots, really! Below is a little collection of stories which caught my attention when I finally sat down to catch-up on the world's goings-on. These are but several among many, to be sure:

• Owen Barder on when innovative finance is good for development - and when it isn't
• Despite China's rapid economic rebound in recent months, many Chinese companies are still operating at a lower level of activity than they had achieved in the boom years
• American chicken feet may be the US's saving grace in its recent (and ongoing) trade war with China
• Nestle is in a bit of a bind as it has been discovered that the company purchases milk from a Zimbabwean farm seized from its white owners and now owned by Mugabe's wife. Now that's a "whoops" moment if I ever saw one...
• The 24 September edition of the Economist had a wonderful special report on the positive potential of mobile money in Africa
• Writing in the European Voice, Jonathan Holslag and Gustaaf Geeraerts argue that Europe should expect to see a more assertive China in the coming years
• A rather biting review of Paul Collier's book, Wars, Guns & Votes written by Dr. Mutuma Ruteere, Research Fellow at the University of Cape Town. The review is written from an anti-imperialist, anti-interventionist tone; certainly worth your time

Noteworthy...

Dear Readers: I will be on the road much of this week, so I'm afraid my blogging will be limited to... well, to be perfectly honest, I doubt I will be blogging at all! I'll be back next week with more news, analysis, and quips about this crazy field of international relations. Until then, today's Noteworthy reads:

Taking Africa beyond Aid. Yet another review of Moyo's book, Dead Aid, and a loud call for the development of African financial markets. As interesting as the piece itself are the comments, which inevitably turn to discussion of the Chinese presence on the continent

How can struggling countries break out of poverty if they're trapped in systems of bad rules? Paul Romer suggests "charter cities" as a possible solution

Something stinks. Must be Scotland's deal with Libya...

Osei Kofi on Africa's lagging contemporary art scene (and what to do about it)

Hugo Restall has an interesting piece in today's WSJ on the threesome that is Latin America (any country will do, really), the U.S. and China. While I tend to disagree with much of his analysis, it is an interesting argument nevertheless

For those among you who believed that China's alleged withdrawal from the deal with the Congo signaled China's retreat from the continent.... I hate to say 'I told you so,' but I told you so: China was never intending to withdraw, it was merely revising its strategy

Have a great week everyone!

Loan collateral - Italian style

Hang on to those bottles of wine and that prosciutto - you may soon be able to use them as collateral in Italian banks! From The Guardian:

The Italian bank Credito Emiliano has long stored hundreds of thousands of parmesan wheels*, worth about ¤300 each, in warehouses as collateral while they age.

Since the bank can sell the cheese if creditors default, it can afford to offer low interest rates to an industry which is suffering from recession and supermarket discounting.

Legs of cured ham, or prosciutto crudo, weighing about 10kg, can sell for hundreds of euros after months of curing in controlled conditions, while bottles of Brunello di Montalcino are regularly snapped up for the same amount.

"We may start off with accepting wine as collateral, but I would prefer the Italian banking association to launch an industry-wide scheme which involves a range of products," said Zonin. "This will help producers in times of crisis as well as when the economy picks up."

Talk about financial innovation! Imagine: a bank vault filled entirely with wine, cheese and ham. How lush! Similar - though not necessarily as 'high end' - initiatives are employed to provide banking to the poor across the developing world. USAID's Rural SPEED program in Uganda, for instance, enables farmers to use their crops as collateral for a loan worth 80% of its value, and sell it later when prices increase. Admittedly, a vault filled with maize isn't as exciting as one filled with wine, but both initiatives do serve to help farmers overcome both the cyclical nature of farm income as well as a general lack of access to credit. Hooray!... and yum!

*link not included in the original Guardian article, but added by Yours Truly...

The crusade for women's rights

The issue of women's rights is one that doesn't appear frequently here at China in Africa, but rest assured that such a lack is not for want of concern or interest. My undergraduate thesis centered on women's land rights in Africa - particularly Kenya and Botswana - and examined especially the conflict between customary and statutory laws, and the entitlements women enjoy under each. Somewhere between trying to understand Chinese foreign policy, parsing out the do's and don'ts of foreign aid, and attempting to decipher a U.S. policy towards Africa (a recent undertaking, to be sure), however, I seem to have placed the issue on the back burner.

A recent NYTimes article by Kristof and WuDunn has seemingly lead me back to the cause. As the piece aptly notes, focusing on women and girls may well be the most effective way of combating global poverty and extremism. For instance:

A series of studies has found that when women hold assets or gain incomes, family money is more likely to be spent on nutrition, medicine and housing, and consequently children are healthier.

This, as opposed to circumstances under which men control the assets. It has been found that men often engage in unwise spending, with the poorest families in the world spending approximately 20% of their incomes on a combination of alcohol, prostitution, candy (candy!!), sugary drinks and lavish feasts - and only 2% on the education of their children. For this reason among others, we are seeing a growing number of microfinance projects directed specifically at women. Additionally:

It has long been known that a risk factor for turbulence and violence is the share of a country’s population made up of young people. Now it is emerging that male domination of society is also a risk factor; the reasons aren’t fully understood, but it may be that when women are marginalized the nation takes on the testosterone-laden culture of a military camp or a high-school boys’ locker room.

Indeed, some scholars believe that the reason Muslim countries have been disproportionately affected by terrorism has little to do with Islamic teachings about infidels or violence, and more to do with low levels of female education and participation in the labor force. I haven't yet had the chance to gather my thoughts on the matter, but a cursory glance at global terrorist hubs and their corresponding women's rights (to the extent that we can even call them that), seemingly lends much credence to the claim.

Kristof and WuDunn ultimately argue that women's rights must be brought to the forefront of the international development agenda, as it is women who perhaps represent our best hope in the fight against global poverty. Fight on, sister, fight on.

[Image: BBC]

2009 Failed States Index (and a map!)

Foreign Policy has again joined forces with the Fund for Peace to compile the 2009 Failed States Index and a wonderful accompanying interactive map of state fragility.

The Index, which ranks 177 states in order from most to least risk of failure, is premised upon 12 social, political, economic and military indicators of state cohesion and performance, and an alleged 30,000 publicly available sources. The 12 indicators are: (1) demographic pressures; (2) refugees/IDPs; (3) group grievance; (4) human flight; (5) uneven development; (6) economic decline; (7) delegitimation of the state; (8) public services; (9) human rights; (10) security apparatus; (11) factionalized elites; (12) and external intervention. The data used are collected from May-December of the preceding year (in this case 2008). More information pertaining to the methodology employed may be found here.

According to the 2009 Index, the ten most fragile states are: (1) Somalia; (2) Zimbabwe; (3) Sudan; (4) Chad; (5) the Congo; (6) Iraq; (7) Afghanistan; (8) Central African Republic; (9) Guinea; (10) and Pakistan. This marks only slight shifts from 2008. No longer included in the top ten is Cote d'Ivoire, which has moved from #8 to #.. well, it appears to be absent from the 2009 ranking! Curious. Guinea, which in 2008 was #11 has now moved up to #9. Beyond this unfortunate bunch, other discernible jumps are those of Kenya (#26 to #14), Georgia (#57 to #33), Iran (#49 to #38), and China's appearance in the top sixty, at #57. Naturally, Norway, followed by Finland and Sweden remain the most stable.

Why has China grown faster than India? And what (if anything) does this mean for Africa?

Chris Blattman and Bill Easterly address the issue. See here, here and here for a great discussion.

While I find myself nodding in agreement with much of what both experts have to say, I hesitate slightly when discussion turns to a near-comparison between growth in China and Africa. While neither scholar seems to be suggesting that China's path to growth can inform a similar phenomenon in Africa - or otherwise delving into very nuanced discussion of the similarities and differences between the process in both regions - I nevertheless feel inclined to caution against any such analogies. There are, of course, lessons which various African countries can learn from China - particularly as regards agricultural policies - but there are many constraints which hinder a direct, general analysis.

Martin Ravallion of the World Bank's Development Research Group has compiled a brilliant presentation highlighting precisely these constraints. Foremost among them:

• Africa's higher levels of income inequality. At the time of China's economic reform, inequality was lower in China (a Gini index well under 30%) than found in all but a couple countries in sub-Saharan Africa today
• The continent's high dependency rates
• Africa's low population density, which impacts on matters such as technological innovation and the cost of supplying certain forms of basic infrastructure
• Africa's weaker state institutions (Blattman's point about differing political climes, etc.)

Of course drawing any comparisons between China and Africa is also somewhat ridiculous, as we're dealing with one country and an entire continent. While this is quite an obvious point to make, you would be surprised at how many people conflate the two.

In short, there are many factors which preclude one from deducing too much about growth in Africa based on how it was played out in China. From my reading, both Easterly and Blattman appear on the brink of such an analysis, but quite wisely never take the plunge. It is precisely for this reason that theirs proves a truly worthwhile debate. Do read it.

Africa does not need more hot air

I must admit that I've been rather disappointed with the present US administration's policies towards Africa. To be perfectly frank, I was much happier with America's African policies under Bush (*gasp* yes, I said it), with few exceptions (AFRICOM, which I have spoken about in the past) is indubitably one of them. What Bush tried to do - and was moderately successful in achieving - was positively engaging with the continent: increasing development assistance where needed, introducing programs to reduce the burden of AIDS and malaria, AGOA, working to secure a peace deal between north and south Sudan in 2005, etc. His policies weren't perfect - many were seriously flawed - but there appeared to be a genuine sense of engagement and interest. Whether that was driven by humanitarian goodwill or geopolitical interests I will leave for you to decide; the point is that the US appeared to be active in creating opportunity for Africans. In short, they not only talked the talk, but walked the walk.

Not only does the Obama administration appear disinterested, but it is seemingly failing to capitalize on opportunities where they exist. I bring this up because Hilary Clinton is presently in Africa. Like many others, I am following the news hoping to discover something - anything - of substance (indeed, something to blog about!), but am seemingly failing in this endeavor (if someone has managed to stumble upon anything worthwhile pertaining to Clinton's time in Africa, do please send it my way). Her rhetoric - much like President Obama's in Ghana earlier this year - is filled with the same empty jargon uttered by Western politicians of yore. Yes, Kenya needs to reform; and yes, we all know that the continent has "enormous potential for progress;" and we all understand the importance of stability in Somalia. Blah, blah, blah. By the by, overemphasizing agricultural policy to the neglect of manufacturing and entrepreneurship does little to foster sustainable development across the continent. And publicly making promises to Somalia's Sheik Sharif is tantamount to wishing death upon his administration. While I do understand that the trip was all quite last minute, there are some things on which a Secretary of State must absolutely be briefed.

While I do further realize that Africa isn't much of a priority for the US government at present (a grave flaw, indeed, given especially China's growing influence across the continent!) and is constrained by the financial crisis and domestic politics, there are things the administration can do besides simply blowing about hot air: increasing diplomacy with leading economies, improving foreign assistance and trade, and being actively involved in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, are foremost among them. Indeed, if the United States seeks genuine relations with African nations, it is in the interest of both parties to move beyond the one-dimensional quality that characterizes them today. One of my favorite bloggers, Texas in Africa, has an absolutely brilliant open letter to Secretary Clinton posted today in which she stresses precisely this point, and goes even further to suggest how the US might actively work to aid the continent. The post is focused primarily on the Congo, but several of the points are indeed quite applicable elsewhere around the continent. Its message even more so.

Where do I sign?

[image: the NYTimes]

On the militarization of foreign assistance, and why it should remain the road less traveled

Further to last week's post on American military bases in Africa, Foreign Policy's William Moseley argues for a halt to the militarization of humanitarian aid across Africa. While Moseley is focused primarily on Mali, where he has been engaged in development work for some 20+ odd years, his line of reasoning may well be applied elsewhere in the continent:

In the West African country of Mali [...] there has been low-grade al Qaeda activity occurring in the northern frontier over the past few years. The marginal desert region between Mali and its neighbors is appealing real estate for would-be terrorists because it is difficult to control and monitor. It provides space for camps and opportunities for terrorist cells to tax cross-border trade and occasionally kidnap foreign nationals for ransom. The U.S. government provides assistance to Mali's military to manage and contain the few, mostly foreign, al Qaeda bands in this small area of the country.

But now the U.S. military is getting involved in development work across Mali and in several other countries in the Sahel region of West Africa -- as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan -- despite the de minimis al Qaeda threat. Now, military personnel repair schools, wells, health centers, roads, and bridges. Army doctors provide basic treatment and vaccinations. In fiscal year 2008, the Defense Department gave the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Mali $9.5 million to run a counterterrorism program, with close coordination between the two. The program provides curriculum advice to Koranic schools and job training for young men (who are seen as highly susceptible to Islamist rhetoric). USAID has also built 14 community radio stations that broadcast programming on peace and tolerance.

But this reframing of aid to Mali within the fight against terrorism could prove counterproductive. The Pentagon has taken its conceptualization of the fight against al Qaeda in war zones and applied it broadly in a peaceful country. In the past, U.S. involvement in West African countries like Mali has focused intently on humanitarian assistance, not a geopolitical agenda.

Indeed, once you increase military involvement in development work to such an extent, such work comes to be viewed by locals as part of a broader military campaign. And while this is quite justified in conflict situations - as are Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance - it may indeed prove counterproductive in an altogether peaceful country, like Mali. While I have absolutely no problem with the U.S. military - or any other foreign military, for that matter - assisting the Malian army in managing the terrorist threat (even running a counterterrorism program if it feels so inclined and such a program is deemed to be of value), I do agree that military involvement in aspects of humanitarian aid in which other agencies are already active, and in many cases better suited, may elevate tensions rather than effectively assisting communities in their needs. This is not to suggest that all military-operated foreign assistance programs be dismantled, but rather that other existing alternatives exhausted before such a path is pursued. And with so many other alternatives, such a path should very rarely be embarked upon.

Has China de-industrialized other developing countries?

Via VoxEU Jorg Mayer and Adrian Wood say 'yes':

A common concern is that China’s opening to trade has de-industrialised other developing countries. Their labour-intensive manufacturing has been hit by Chinese competition in their home markets – a complaint often heard in Africa and Latin America – and in export markets, while their primary exports have been pulled up by Chinese demand. This mixture of effects is worrying because industrialisation is vital for development, manufacturing provides jobs, and the ownership of natural resources is often highly unequal – so the net impact of China could be both slower growth and greater inequality in the rest of the developing world.

Standard trade theory is consistent with these concerns. The impact of China on other countries can be interpreted in a Heckscher-Ohlin model as occurring through a shift in world average factor endowments. The comparative advantage of a country depends on its endowments not in isolation but relative to the endowments of all other countries involved in trade. This comparator group was altered by China’s emergence from near-autarky, because of its size and distinctive endowment structure, and hence so was the comparative advantage of other countries.

More specifically, China’s opening to trade effectively lowered the world average land/labour ratio and increased the share of workers with a basic education in the world labour force. The relative endowments of other countries were thus shifted in the opposite directions, which tended to move their comparative advantage away from labour-intensive manufacturing, which requires many workers with a basic education but little land. The corresponding increase in comparative advantage for developing countries was in primary production, which uses a lot of land relative to labour.

Mayer and Wood present data depicting average changes in ratios of labor-intensive manufacturing in primary production in the 1980s and 1990s, and the differences between these decades, for output and two sets of export data. From this data it appears that the bulk of China's impact was concentrated in the 1990s. Figures from Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa further show negative differences between output and export ratios, which is consistent with the expected impact of China proffered by standard trade theory.

Show us the money (for health) !!

Namibia-based AIDS activist group, AIDS & Rights Alliance for Southern Africa, has compiled a creative video campaign to bring attention to the seemingly forgotten 2001 pledge made by African leaders to devote 15% of their national budgets to healthcare. Eight years later, nearly all countries have failed to meet this target.

The ARASA video, "Lords of the Bling (Vol. 1)" (funny because it's true, I suppose!) depicts the amount of treatment that could be paid for with the amount of money spent on extravagant purchases and events by the continent's political leaders. The figures are absolutely startling:

[HT: Shashank Bengali]

Humming a familiar tune

Barack Obama delivererd his speech to Ghana's Parliament this past Saturday (full text of the speech may be found here) in what was his first presidential trip to sub-Saharan Africa. A collection of opinions on the speech may be found at the BBC's fantastic 'Africa Have Your Say' program.

What I have to say is this: While there is little denying the significance of Obama's trip or the importance of his now oft-repeated statement that "Africa's future is up to Africans," the content of his speech was altogether unsurprising and contained nothing that hasn't already been said. Like other Western leaders who have addressed African nations in the past, Obama came touting the need for Africans to embrace democracy and market capitalism; to battle corruption, cease the ongoing violence, work with the West to combat disease and - in short - embrace the 21st century. This is all well and good, but such catch-phrases amount to no more than empty suits when not substantiated with specifics. Even his claim that Africa's future rests with its own people has been made numerous times in the past; most recently by the likes of Bill Easterly, President Kagame of Rwanda, and Dambisa Moyo in her ever-controversial book Dead Aid.

There was a welcomed shift in tone when Obama promised to cut down on funding American consultants and administrators and instead put resources and training into the hands of those who need them (i.e. resident Africans), as well as when he highlighted the economic possibilities implicit in African entrepreneurship (which, again, Kagame has been stressing for some time). But overall the speech diverged little from previous U.S. policy statements on Africa, no less so given Obama's insistence on continuing Bush's terrible idea of Africa Command. As Bill Easterly aptly notes in today's post, "[...] goodwill for U.S. military is nonexistent after a long history of Cold War Africa interventions, post-Cold War fumbles, reinforced by the more recent fiascos of Iraq and Afghanistan. Africans will never see US military (or any other Western force) as a neutral and benevolent force." *Sigh* When will we learn?

Of course the speech was inspirational - as may of President Obama's speeches are - and quite empowering for many Africans (and, apparently, for the UK Times' Libby Purves who sees a fantastic "new start" where those who understand African history and politics see none). Yet it pales in comparison to the speech Obama gave in Cairo when he addressed the Islamic world, and fails to represent much in the way of a novel shift in U.S. policy towards Africa and its people. Yes, Africans must pull themselves up by their bootstraps if they are to make anything of themselves, but didn't we (and they) know that already?

In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king

Business Action for Africa recently released a new report on what businesses can do to sustain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) in Africa. The report brings together insights from various business leaders and NGOs, as well as from the likes of Paul Collier, Kofi Annan and Lord Malloch-Brown, among others. Many of the contributions seemingly follow the standard protocol of touting transparency, governance, business environment reforms, effective public-private partnerships, investments in the private sector, and other well-known policy prescriptions. As Richard Laing, Chief Executive of CDC aptly notes:

Much has already been said about the impact of the global downturn on Africa, but a great deal of the talk about solutions has been empty rhetoric full of generalisms that regard Africa as one homogenous place. Any simple prognosis for the continent’s economic future ignores the fact that there are 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa with differing economies and at varying stages of development. It is action, not talk, that is required.

That said, there is one particularly worthwhile analysis, written by Dr. Peter Eigen, Chairman of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Eigen writes:

In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. When it comes to knowing how the global financial crisis will affect Africa we are all living in the land of the blind. Usually we can rely on the IMF to be the one-eyed man, but the IMF’s growth predictions for 2009 give such a mixture of signals that it is impossible to form a clear overall picture. We do know, however, that 2009 will see a series of difficult social and political changes in Africa: elections, strikes, civil unrest, rising fuel and food prices, and a more challenging environment for exports. Because of Africa’s unique finance and liquidity circumstances, and due to volatile exchange rates and commodities prices, it is safe to assume that the financial crisis will be felt differently in Africa than elsewhere.

Eigen's acknowledgment of the uncertain is quite refreshing; for as much as we think we may know about Africa's future trajectory and development needs, there is indeed that much more than we don't. Eigen is also particularly prudent in his discussions of EITI - the very organization of which he is Chairman: "The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has long been held up as a shining example of how multi-stakeholder initiatives can address these kinds of challenges. But much of this praise has been premature. The initiative is still young." Such rhetoric comes in stark contrast to others in the development field who proclaim with overwhelming conclusiveness the merits of their formulaic approaches to poverty alleviation/aid/whatever, embryonic though these approaches may still be. Every now and again it's nice to be reminded that there are people in the field who are guided not by grandiose visions but by practical, thought-out solutions to given problems. Thank you, Mr. Eigen

In any event, do read the report; it will surely be worth your while.

Development in dangerous places (aka a symposium on Paul Collier and his policies)

In the July/August issue of Boston Review one can find Paul Collier's essay on development in dangerous places (which appears to be a fantastic cut-and-paste exercise from both The Bottom Billion and Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places), along with a host of commentary from the likes of William Easterly, Nancy Birdsall and Larry Diamond, among others.

Easterly for one is not particularly pleased, neither with Collier's policy prescriptions nor the means by which he arrives at them:

I have been troubled by Paul Collier’s research and policy advocacy for some time. In this essay he goes even further in directions I argued were dangerous in his previous work. Collier wants to de facto recolonize the “bottom billion,” and he justifies his position with research that is based on one logical fallacy, one mistaken assumption, and a multitude of fatally flawed statistical exercises.

[...] Collier’s convoluted stories are made up after the fact to fit whatever random collection of data points he is working with at the moment. So the specious rationalizations keep changing—too bad for those who took the precise recommendations in The Bottom Billion as gospel.

Larry Diamond adopts a more cautionary tone, stressing the salience of governance as a key to development:

None of these endemically poor countries can climb out of misery without better governance. Collier appreciates this, but he does not fully grasp the vital distinction between Asia’s developmental dictatorships and Africa’s dictatorial disasters. The classic authoritarian Asian tigers—Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia—all had near-death experiences with communism that led them to realize it was time to “develop or die. [...] Whatever their other faults, all of these countries’ ruling elites (and later the regimes in China and Vietnam) came to identify their own political interests with generating the public goods necessary for transformative development.

I strongly endorse Collier’s appeal for a much more serious and sustained international commitment to reinforce or guarantee security and peace in the world’s most fragile and miserable states. [...] However, I cannot go along with Collier’s suggestion that we implicitly threaten to tolerate a military coup against a civilian leader who has stolen an election. How would that have made Kenya or Nigeria better off? [...] The answer to any unconstitutional seizure of power—whether by a civilian in a rigged election or a soldier in a coup—is cutting off international aid; targeted sanctions against the overseas personal assets and travel options of the power-usurper, his family, and supporters; and a credible threat of indictment and prosecution by the International Criminal Court for predatory corruption, which should be made a crime against humanity—for that is surely what it is.

Much more commentary, criticism and insights may be found at the Boston Review link.

[HT: Marginal Revolution]

PS. Don't call Collier's policies colonialist...

A new take on the bottom (three) billion

Three billion individuals. That's the approximate number of people that would be scrapped if we were to eliminate the bottom 5% global GDP contributors, the vast majority of which are found in either Africa or Southeast Asia. 81 countries comprise this bottom 5%. Together they represent half of the 192 UN member states and nearly 43% of the world population.

What would the world look like without them? Via Strange Maps we are offered a glimpse:

In reverse order of magnitude the 81 countries are:

Zimbabwe, Burundi, DR Congo, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Malawi, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Afghanistan, Togo, Guinea, Uganda, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Nepal, Myanmar (Burma), Rwanda, Mozambique, East Timor, the Gambia, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Lesotho, Ghana, Haiti, Tajikistan, the Comoros, Cambodia, Laos, Benin, Kenya, Chad, the Solomon Islands, Kyrgyzstan, India, Nicaragua, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe, Ivory Coast, Zambia, the Yemen, Cameroon, Djibouti, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nigeria, Guyana, the Sudan, Bolivia, Moldova, Honduras, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Bhutan, Egypt, Vanuatu, Tonga, Paraguay, Morocco, Syria, Swaziland, Samoa, Guatemala, Georgia, the Congo, Iraq, Armenia, Jordan, Cape Verde, the Maldives, Fiji and Namibia.

It is equally curious to note which countries are not included among the bottom 5%. Any surprises?

China extends $950 million loan to Zimbabwe

Well, the post title says it all. Not to be outdone by recent American and U.K. offers of foreign aid, China has today agreed to a huge loan for Zimbabwe. The figure is nearly double what Prime Minister Tsvangirai received on his visits to the US and Europe earlier this month, and is meant to help the country revive its economy.

China has also promised increased investments in Zimbabwe, with more companies moving in to set up shop. While the obvious concerns over propping up rogue regimes persist, few appear interested in articulating them. What's more, where before Western nations were lambasting China for its assistance to questionable regimes, they now appear to be following suit (to an extent, mind you). It would seem that China is perhaps reshaping the international aid architecture after all.

More on international land purchases (and what to do about them)

Further to last week's post on international land purchases in developing countries (mainly in Africa, really), an interesting piece in today's VoxEU suggests that such purchases could be good news "if the objectives of the land purchasers are reconciled with the investment needs of developing countries." Quite an obvious statement, really, but how does one go about ensuring that this is the case?

According to authors Denis Drechsler and David Hallam:

Apart from improving the conditions of land deals, several looser contractual arrangements should also be considered. In fact, the purchase and direct use of land resources is only one strategic response to the food security problems of countries with limited land and water. A variety of other mechanisms can offer just as much – or even higher – security of supply, such as contract farming and out-grower schemes, bilateral agreements including counter-trade, and improvement of international food market information systems.

Investment could be in much-needed infrastructure and institutions that currently constrain agriculture in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. This, together with efforts to improve the efficiency and reliability of world markets as sources of food could raise food security for all concerned through an expansion of production and trade possibilities.

What Drechsler and Hallam are effectively proposing is a "binding code of conduct" which would govern land purchases, as well as a thorough search for alternatives, as noted above. What neither they nor anyone else have been able to tease out, however, is what a regulatory framework will look like, should there be one. Will each recipient state have the authority to establish its own guidelines, or will they be enforced through an agency like the UN FAO, for instance?

While many questions abound, it's heartening to see that the debate on land purchases and food security is finally being brought to the forefront, where it arguably should have been several years ago.

Noteworthy…. the aid edition

Via Mo'Modernity Mo'problems the newest 'twinning' aid initiative: toilet aid

Broadband has arrived in East Africa. The 2,790 mile East Africa Marine System underwater cable connected Mombassa with Fujairah in the UAE on 12 June and is expected to become fully operational within three months. A great map of the cable (as well as others) can be found here

Education and ... football for all?

Blood and Milk's Alanna has a great post on what aid workers can learn from missionaries (note: this has nothing to do with converting people!)

China's place in the international aid architecture

Deborah Brautigam has a truly great and thought-provoking article on the ways in which China is challenging the international aid architecture (with significant focus on sub-Saharan Africa). According to Brautigam, it's not as doom and gloom as one might be inclined think:

... unlike the West, which buys oil in places like Angola without much caring how the government uses the revenue generated, Beijing buys Angola's oil while ensuring that the purchase price goes to pay its companies to build infrastructure. This is the essence of "win-win," as proposed by the Chinese in their African engagement.

While China's development program is indubitably flawed in many ways, it appears to be quite right in many others. What's more, Chinese foreign aid - largely in the form of oil-for-infrastructure contracts - is an attractive alternative for recipient states which are in dire need of infrastructure (and likewise tired of the Western ways of doing things). As Brautigam aptly observes, China's development aid reflects, among other things, its understanding and assumptions about the road out of poverty. As such, it stands as a challenge to the traditional aid architecture.

Kenya's jua kali and Chinese businesses - and a shameless plug

Yours truly has a paper published in the July 2009 issue of the Journal of Eastern African Studies on the nature of Chinese business networks in Kenya. The paper can be found here (subscription required).