Changed priorities ahead

For the past few months I have been toying with the idea of returning to blogging, having (rather reluctantly) given up the enterprise some time ago. The thing with bloggers these day, I find, is that they do it constantly or not at all: it's either job-like or it's not. Falling the category of 'almost-but-not-quite-willing-to-dedicate-my-life-to-blogging' of bloggers, I relinquished the task, only to be confronted by an old Oxford tutor of mine the other day, who immediately prompted to enquire about my absence from the blog-o-sphere. Perhaps his words were merely intended as polite chit-chat, or perhaps he was indeed genuine in his desire to see my thoughts plastered all over the internet -- either way, here I am back; inspired and ready and willing to reengage in discussion with those of you out there.

My time away has been quite curious, divided as it was between fieldwork in Addis Ababa, holidays on the American east coast, and -- of course -- Oxford. My research has shifted slightly, away from the more economical and towards the more political. My time in the field has led me to the (perhaps anticlimactic) conclusion that China's economic competition in Africa can largely be understood in simple market economic terms (i.e. competition), and save for curious loopholes and investment advantages enjoyed by Chinese firms, the story more or less stops there. Where it begins is with the political and cultural/societal implications of China's engagement with Africa: not only for the African countries themselves, but for the region and international community more generally.

The NYTime's David Sanger had a perhaps slightly obvious though nevertheless worthwhile piece on "the three faces of China" which very much speaks to this issue. Sanger argues:

In one sense, there’s nothing surprising about a rising power finding subtle ways to handle complex problems. But before China’s breakout from poverty to arguably the world’s No. 2 economy, its default position on foreign policy was to restate the principle of non-interference in other nations’ affairs and focus largely on its neighborhood.

That was before it had the military resources and the incentive to start thinking of how to secure and defend interests around the globe. Today, its interests include access to oil in places like Sudan and Iran, safe shipping around the Horn of Africa, the ability to manipulate its currency for its own gain.

And for the first time, the world is seeing a distinct range of behaviors, from aggressive to passive-aggressive to diplomatic, in places that 20 years ago China’s leaders rarely thought about.

What American diplomats and analysts now have to figure out is what drives China’s actions and responses, how to try to shape them and, some would argue, what limits to try to set

Not only American diplomats, but indeed international leaders generally. Though the 'China threat' theory was perhaps a bit too overplayed, China's global political rise remains largely underplayed, presented as an event that may or may not occur at some point in the distant future. A balance must be found, preferably sooner rather than later.

While you were gone...

Dearest Readers: I apologize sincerely for the rather embarrassing lack of posting in recent days (or has it been weeks, already?). I have several writing projects on my plate at the moment (not to mention the mammoth beast that is the PhD), all of which have served to hamper my desire to blog when I manage to steal away some ever-fleeting moments of spare time. That said, I have not abandoned you and will continue to post in this space when I can (hopefully more frequently going forward!).

Now, let's get back to business, shall we? It seems that among the golden rules governing the IR world is the ever-wise maxim, "don't blink or you'll miss it." Much has happened in the way of Sino-African relations since I last wrote. To that end, I've collected a not-so-brief list of stories which have surfaced during my absence, and which I deem especially worthy of note:

• The FT last week ran a special report on Kenya. Whilst many "special reports" of such a nature have previously been written, I found this one especially well crafted and comprehensive, covering issues ranging from the country's leadership crisis to its extreme (and extremely fickle) climate
• Always sharp, always informative, Elizabeth Dickinson asks whether China's Guinea deal is for real. Emerging evidence suggests that the deal may actually amount to nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Guineans, though given the shroud of secrecy under which the Chinese (and by and large Guineans) operate, the actual reality of the matter is anyone's best guess. I find it perfectly typical, though: Guinea is embroiled in turmoil and gross human rights violations; the international community is ready to impose sanctions; and China is soldering on with its oil and investment deals. Where have we seen this before?
• Unsurprisingly, an increasing body of experts are calling for heightened transparency in China's Africa investments. I wouldn't be surprised if Beijing will over time begin declassifying a select pool of documents surrounding its African activities - not because it will have suddenly decided to operate within the international regulatory framework, but for the very reason that by appeasing Western demands in this regard it will be able to continue doing as it pleases. Give a little, take a lot seems to be the name of the game.
• In the name of fairness, however, if one is to be critical of the Chinese for their African oil investments, one should seemingly be equally condemnatory of the Bush family....
• A sad twist of irony in our technologically advanced world: phones appear to be more widespread than food. Might we - in our constant pursuit of all things bigger, better and faster - be losing sight of the basic needs of the world's poor? Food for thought (no pun intended)
• An interesting glance into the DRC's 2009 budget (HT: Texas in Africa). As Texas in Africa aptly notes, the best thing about the budget is how easy it is to see where the money is being stolen. The whole thing reads quite like a satirical novella. Well, almost.
• The 2009 Forum on China Africa Cooperation is due to take place in Egypt on 8-9 November. I look forward to reading the newly revised China Africa strategy which, I'm quite certain, will read exactly like the old one
• A most harrowing account of human rights violations in North Korea from The Economist. While North Korea is generally discussed solely in terms of its nuclear ambitions and contentious behavior on the international stage, one often forgets of the country's population, which is suffering under the most atrocious and deplorable conditions
• On the near-eve of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Brahma Chellaney puts 1989 in global comparative perspective: Europe got freedom, Asia got rich. And, twenty years later, China's authoritarian capitalism stands to challenge the global spread of democratic values. How much happens in such a short period of history.

Understanding China's international behavior

The RAND Corporation has released a most worthwhile report on China's international behavior. Sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, the report:

analyzes the content, character, and execution of China’s international behavior. It examines how China views its security environment, how it defines its foreign policy objectives, how it is pursuing these objectives, and the consequences for U.S. economic and security interests.

While I haven't yet made my way through the document in its entirety, I can comfortably say that it does an excellent job of highlighting and explaining the breadth and rapidity of China's international exploits, without the sense of panic that now plagues the majority of such reports emanating from the U.S.. The report examines China's foreign policy strategy from the point of view of Beijing's objectives, and stresses especially the ways in which China is working within the current international system while at the same time altering it to its advantage. The full report may be found here.

The U.S. and China: best friends forever? Don't hold your breath

Or so say Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini in the WSJ:

American and Chinese officials said all the right things during this summer's inaugural round of their Strategic and Economic Dialogue. President Barack Obama pledged to "forge a path to the future that we seek for our children." Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo wondered aloud whether America and China can "build better relations despite very different social systems, cultures and histories." He answered his own question, in English, with a "Yes we can."

They can, but they probably won't. Yes, Mr. Obama will visit China in November. But when it comes to international burden-sharing, Washington is focused on geopolitical headaches while China confines its heavy-lifting to geoeconomic challenges. The two sides have good reason to cooperate, but there's a growing gap between what Washington expects from Beijing and what the Chinese can deliver.

I couldn't have said it better myself. Indeed, despite the flowery rhetoric and displays of diplomacy, it is most unlikely that the United States and China will come to establish a strategic partnership anytime in the near future. This has less to do with Washington's efforts, and everything to do with Beijing's lack of desire.

In their WSJ piece, Bremmer and Roubini highlight several obvious and less obvious obstacles to partnership. Most important among them in my view (economic tensions aside) is the third, which stresses the divergence in geopolitical goals between China and the U.S. China currently has very little interest in assuming a broad global role: it has no desire to shoulder the responsibilities that come with involvement in Iraq or Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, etc. Beijing isn't interested in filling the shoes of the world's policeman, if for no other reason than its continued adherence to the 'non-interference policy' - its recent evolution notwithstanding. What's more, Beijing depends on many troublesome countries (Iran, for instance) for its energy imports, and thus isn't likely to take a stand against them in a way that would be pleasing to the United States (or the rest of the international community, for that matter) anytime soon.

The underlying motive for much - if not all - of China's overseas exploits is its own self-interest: its growth and security. Where these objectives line up with global and U.S. demands, great. Where they don't... well, tough beans. As Bremmer and Roubini aptly note, one of course shouldn't be too quick to dismiss the value of U.S.-China dialogues and the surrounding political symbolism. When it comes to concretes, however, both parties are pulling in opposite directions - and likely will be for some time to come.

PS: I doubt that Chinese propaganda blaming the swine flu virus on America does much to further anything resembling a strategic partnership. At least the propaganda cartoon is cute....

Thank you for your message... again

The CS Monitor has compiled a most noteworthy map of sorts detailing the content of Hilary Clinton's message on her recent trip to Africa. The image accompanies a great piece by CS contributor Tracey Samuelson from which we learn that, well, American politicians quite generally have very little to say to their African counterparts, having instead opted to master the art of recycling messages that have been touted since the 1970s - or thereabouts (Ms. Samuelson does not mention this point; I have noted it here to stress the general absurdity and lack of a U.S. policy towards Africa).

Honestly, what's the point of undertaking an extensive African tour if the message will more or less be the same across the board? Presumably it's much more efficient to go to one country, get all the points out and instruct all other African governments to "See [insert country here] for message."* Based on the CS Monitor's map, a simple trip to Angola would have more or less done the trick:

Now don't misunderstand me, the vast majority of the issues Secretary Clinton brought up are quite worthwhile and indeed applicable in the contexts in which they were raised. Yes, of course we must discuss HIV/AIDS in South Africa and the security crisis in Kenya. And given that Angolan oil exports are of particularly great importance to U.S. strategic interests, the trade terms surrounding them must also enter into discussion. I'm not at all suggesting that her rhetoric was necessarily wrong, only that it was quite generally meaningless and did absolutely nothing to carve out an American policy towards the continent. Blanket statements are fine and dandy for a time, but at a certain point it becomes necessary to delve into the nitty gritty details of policy. Well, we are well beyond that point and seemingly no such efforts are being made - not by the U.S. at least; the Chinese have been on point for quite some time now.

* I am, of course, being completely facetious in suggesting such a thing and strongly favor a much more nuanced U.S. policy towards Africa. Unfortunately, few in State have yet to catch on to this novel idea...

Whither America's Africa policy? No, seriously. Where is it?

I really can do no better today than to direct you to Shashank's well thought out post in which he concludes:

After seven months, a presidential visit and now this major trip, it's still unclear what the Obama administration wants to do differently in Africa. The most important U.S. agency that works on Africa, USAID, still has no leader. Clinton's trip was full of the same hopeful but canned rhetoric about "good governance," "food security" and "helping Africans help themselves." Folks who care about Africa hardly expect the continent to be the Obama administration's No. 1 foreign policy priority. But they will be disappointed with this trip.

Not only is it disappointing, but it's actually quite laughable - and not in a joyous laughter sort of way. I really don't understand how anyone is meant to take US policy towards Africa (the presently non-existent policy, mind you) seriously when the country's own Secretary of State makes such ridiculous statements as her proposal for camcorders in the Congo, and her lending of support to Somalia's Sheik Sharif - evidently unaware of the consequences - among others. Her utterly distasteful outburst in the Congo doesn't do much to bolster her, or American, credibility either (surely there was a classier, more professional way of handling the matter, even if it upset you, Madame Secretary), and neither does her outlandish comparison of the 2000 Florida recount to Nigeria's rigged elections. I am terribly sorry to discover that she is still seemingly bitter over the matter, but drawing such faulty moral equivalences jeopardizes the advance of democracy in countries like Nigeria and others across Africa where corruption is rampant. To draw my own comparison, the ridiculousness implicit in such a statement is tantamount to that which would compare women's rights in, say, Sierra Leone - the worst place in Africa to be a woman according to the 2008 UN Human Development Report - to those in the United States. Think on that.

While Secretary Clinton may be dancing away across the continent, the U.S. missed a prime opportunity to seriously engage with African leaders on matters of trade, foreign assistance, human rights - heck, even the objectives behind AFRICOM - and other matters of actual consequence to the continent. It's little wonder that African leaders are more seriously engaging with the Chinese as regards their countries' needs and policies. I probably would, too.

On IR theory and the African challenge

Via Ryan C. Briggs I happened across a great site - Theory Talks - which serves as an interactive forum for discussion of debates in IR (international relations) with especial emphasis on the underlying theoretical issues. If you're like me, teasing out the appropriate theoretical framework for one's work is often the most challenging part of any research project, which is why I greatly appreciate what Theory Talks is trying to do. While the site certainly won't help to sort a framework for individual projects, it does present interesting perspectives and raise fascinating debates on issues surrounding the ever-evolving discipline that is IR.

Among the more curious "talks" I found (and there are quite a few!) is that by Kevin C. Dunn, visiting professor at Mbarara University in Uganda, who has written extensively on African politics with especial focus on the Congo. Dunn argues that images of countries (like the Congo, for instance) are often social constructions, which renders field work for the "white man" a very biased field, indeed:

The identity of the Congo, like other social identities, has been formed by being located within the narratives that we use to know, understand, and make sense of the social world. Narratives of national identities are formed by a gradual layering on and connecting of events and meanings, usually through three steps: the selection of events themselves, the linking of these events to each other in causal and associational ways (plotting), and interpreting what the events and plots signify. The example of the Congo is illuminating because it shows how these identity-constructing narratives are rarely the exclusive product of a state’s policy makers. External forces are constantly at play, seeking to select, plot and interpret the events and meanings by which identities are narrated.

The central thesis of Dunn's talk is that IR scholars are political actors as much as the phenomena they study. Being as such, it is inevitable that their research and findings are biased based on their constructed perceptions of their respective subject matters. Such bias, Dunn argues, is particularly pronounced in research focused on Africa, much of which is approached from a North American/Western European perspective where an idealized North American/Western European state is taken as the norm. Dunn's is an interesting discussion, and certainly one worth reading for any IR scholars with a focus on Africa.

For all African-centric theoretical debates see here.

Africa does not need more hot air

I must admit that I've been rather disappointed with the present US administration's policies towards Africa. To be perfectly frank, I was much happier with America's African policies under Bush (*gasp* yes, I said it), with few exceptions (AFRICOM, which I have spoken about in the past) is indubitably one of them. What Bush tried to do - and was moderately successful in achieving - was positively engaging with the continent: increasing development assistance where needed, introducing programs to reduce the burden of AIDS and malaria, AGOA, working to secure a peace deal between north and south Sudan in 2005, etc. His policies weren't perfect - many were seriously flawed - but there appeared to be a genuine sense of engagement and interest. Whether that was driven by humanitarian goodwill or geopolitical interests I will leave for you to decide; the point is that the US appeared to be active in creating opportunity for Africans. In short, they not only talked the talk, but walked the walk.

Not only does the Obama administration appear disinterested, but it is seemingly failing to capitalize on opportunities where they exist. I bring this up because Hilary Clinton is presently in Africa. Like many others, I am following the news hoping to discover something - anything - of substance (indeed, something to blog about!), but am seemingly failing in this endeavor (if someone has managed to stumble upon anything worthwhile pertaining to Clinton's time in Africa, do please send it my way). Her rhetoric - much like President Obama's in Ghana earlier this year - is filled with the same empty jargon uttered by Western politicians of yore. Yes, Kenya needs to reform; and yes, we all know that the continent has "enormous potential for progress;" and we all understand the importance of stability in Somalia. Blah, blah, blah. By the by, overemphasizing agricultural policy to the neglect of manufacturing and entrepreneurship does little to foster sustainable development across the continent. And publicly making promises to Somalia's Sheik Sharif is tantamount to wishing death upon his administration. While I do understand that the trip was all quite last minute, there are some things on which a Secretary of State must absolutely be briefed.

While I do further realize that Africa isn't much of a priority for the US government at present (a grave flaw, indeed, given especially China's growing influence across the continent!) and is constrained by the financial crisis and domestic politics, there are things the administration can do besides simply blowing about hot air: increasing diplomacy with leading economies, improving foreign assistance and trade, and being actively involved in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, are foremost among them. Indeed, if the United States seeks genuine relations with African nations, it is in the interest of both parties to move beyond the one-dimensional quality that characterizes them today. One of my favorite bloggers, Texas in Africa, has an absolutely brilliant open letter to Secretary Clinton posted today in which she stresses precisely this point, and goes even further to suggest how the US might actively work to aid the continent. The post is focused primarily on the Congo, but several of the points are indeed quite applicable elsewhere around the continent. Its message even more so.

Where do I sign?

[image: the NYTimes]

Uncle Sam's African footprint

This week's issue of The New Statesman has a curious map tracking America's 'military footprint' around the world (i.e. the global distribution of American military bases):

From the map it is quite clear that the majority of U.S. bases are found in parts of Europe and the Middle East. In Africa, bases are located in Algeria, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda. Many of these countries were considered for the home of AFRICOM, the US-Africa military command established under Bush (Esquire, of all places, had a great piece on the Africa Command programme back in 2007. Certainly worth a read!)

Many African states have been - and remain - quite vocal over their displeasure with the presence of such bases, maintaining that they constitute a direct violation of their sovereignty. Equally so, other states appear quite enthused to garner the assistance of the United States military in dealing with various regional issues. While I do certainly have my opinions on the matter, none are yet fixed in stone. What are your thoughts on U.S. military presence in Africa?

On Jay-Z as the world's greatest hegemon and rapping feuds as exemplars of soft power politics

It really doesn't get any better than this. Marc Lynch, a professor at George Washington University and director of the Institute of Middle East Studies, has taken to explaining international relations via the world of rap:

The way that rappers compete with each other — this is soft power. [...] This is the way you try and make a reputation, try and get what you want, and you have to do it through this very intricate series of alliances.

Particularly telling according to Lynch is the ongoing feud between rapper Jay-Z and up-and-comer The Game:

Jay-Z has been attacking other rappers for using Auto-Tune software, which corrects pitch while singers record. Auto-Tune is widely used in the industry, but Jay-Z is making a call for authenticity.

"He's saying 'these are the rules of the international system. If you want to be a civilized member of our international society, you have to not pursue nuclear weapons,''' Lynch says.

The Game is using the opportunity to tag Jay-Z as old and irrelevant.

The Game, then, is like North Korea or Iran: "He might not win, but he can hurt you if he drags you down into this extended occupation, this extended counterinsurgency campaign." And Jay-Z, a hegemon like the United States, can ill afford to get embroiled in little battles all the time. My goodness. So, then, what's a hegemon like Jay-Z to do? In his full-fledged editorial Lynch proffers a solution:

If he hits back hard in public, the Game will gain in publicity even if he loses... the classic problem of a great power confronted by a smaller annoying challenger. And given his demonstrated skills and talent, and his track record against G-Unit, the Game may well score some points. At the least, it would bring Jay-Z down to his level — bogging him down in an asymmetric war negating the hegemon's primary advantages. If Jay-Z tries to use his structural power to kill Game's career (block him from releasing albums or booking tour dates or appearing at the Grammy Awards), it could be seen as a wimpy and pathetic operation — especially since it would be exposed on Twitter and the hip hop blogs.

The Realist advice? His best hope is probably to sit back and let the Game self-destruct, something of which he's quite capable (he's already backing away from the hit on Beyonce) — while working behind the scenes to maintain his own alliance structure and to prevent any defections over to the Game's camp. And it seems that thus far, that's exactly what he's doing. We'll see if that's a winning strategy.... or if he's just biding his time getting ready for a counter-attack.

A lesson for all of us who thought rap wasn't educational. Happy weekend, everyone!

[HT: Freakanomics]

Don't cry for me Latin America. Yet.

While this blog is mostly devoted to issues surrounding the Sino-African partnership, one must not forget that China is similarly active in other regions of the world, most recently Latin America. China's strategies in Latin America seem to differ little from those employed in Africa, with 'oil-for-infrastructure' deals, tech investments, extensive bilateral trade agreements, and the influx of cheap Chinese goods as the wooing tactics of choice. Trade between China and Latin America soared from $10 billion in 2000 to $140 billion in 2008.

As is true of Africa, Beijing's main interest in Latin America is the guaranteeing of access to the region's raw materials - oil, soybeans, copper, iron ore, etc. - to fuel its continued rapid growth. Yet as is also true in Africa, China's ambitions are also grandly geopolitical. According to Tyler Bridges:

China is beefing up its embassies throughout Latin America, opening Confucian centers to expand Chinese culture, sending high-level trade delegations throughout the region and opening the door for ordinary Chinese to visit Machu Picchu, Rio, and other tourism hot spots.

Aiping Yuan came to Rio de Janeiro from Beijing in 1997 on a lark, fell in love with the city, and decided to stay. She studied Portuguese, and when Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made his first visit to China in 2004, she opened a small school in Rio to teach Mandarin.

She began with six students and today has 300, including senior executives at Petrobras, the country's biggest oil company, and Vale do Rio Doce, the biggest mineral producer. Both have growing business with China.

"Chinese is the language of the future for Brazil," Yuan said with a big smile.

Chinese will be the language of more than just Brazil if Beijing's leaders have anything to do with it. As Bridges aptly observes, China is buying zinc from Peru, copper from Chile, and iron ore from Brazil. It's shipping equipment to Brazil, buses to Cuba, clothes to Mexico and cars to Peru. Chinese tech giants Huawei and ZTE are likewise grabbing business from established telecom suppliers across the continent, most prominently in Argentina, Chile and Colombia. Yet while China seemingly has a Latin America strategy (or perhaps a 'developing world' strategy more generally; it's hard to tell), Latin America doesn't appear to have a China strategy.

Writing in his excellent blog, Tom Pellman cites David Shambaugh who notes:

Latin America is acting toward China's expansion in the world in a reactive, disorganized or ad hoc fashion. When I asked Itamaraty (Brazil's foreign ministry) about its strategy on China, I got blank stares. There is no strategy.

Such a lack of strategy indubitably works to the detriment of Latin American states - as it does African nations which similarly lack much in the way of a policy of engagement with the eager Chinese - who stand to gain from Chinese investment. In Latin America, as much as in Africa, there are many benefits to be accrued from recent Chinese interest. Yet without a plan of action, it seems that China will walk away as the sole beneficiary when all is said and done.

When China rules the world...

Macleans - Canada's national weekly current affairs magazine - has a truly fascinating interview with academic and journalist Martin Jacques on the consequences of the coming global shift in power. The dialogue is particularly interesting because it discusses not only the ways in which China's political ideology will inform its (potential) hegemonic role, but it also does well to emphasize the particular tenets of Chinese culture which permeate its society and governance.

An excerpt:

If we want to try and understand what China’s going to be like, then the best place to start looking is East Asia, because that is China’s own region. China’s culture has had a major influence on the whole region in varying degrees for thousands of years—most obviously in the case of Japan, Korea and Vietnam. It’s a very sophisticated culture from its language to its literature to its food. These are elements of what we’ve termed soft power, and Chinese soft power is going to be hugely influential in East Asia in the future.

In East Asia, and in Africa, and in Latin America....

Reading between the lines

It's interesting to observe the varying ways in which the Iranian crisis is depicted in the global news. What aspects are being highlighted? Excluded? Altogether mischaracterized? James Fallows has a worthwhile post outlining several guidelines to bear in mind when reading Chinese (official) responses to the crisis. An obvious though important example:

It is worth remembering that the elements of the Iranian story that give it such drama and importance in much of the world are less automatically resonant in China.

One part of the narrative -- a massed populace standing up against state power -- is obviously anathema to Chinese authorities. And many of the other themes are also less immediate and compelling to ordinary people in China than they would be in North America, Europe, or parts of the Islamic world.

To most Westerners, everything about this story matters. It involves a people's struggle to make their voices heard; it follows other "color revolutions" in former Soviet territories and indeed popular movements for democracy and rule of law in Asia and Latin America from the 1980s onwards; it potentially marks a crucial moment in the evolution of modern Islamic society; it can have war-and-peace implications for US foreign policy and Israeli actions; and so on. Ordinary members of the Western viewing audience feel a connection to these themes. I assert that they seem more distant to ordinary people in China -- even if the themes were featured on the news. People's own problems, and their business problems, and the country's problems, are enough to worry about.

Several curious examples of the way in which the story is being played out in China can be found here (a classic example of the 'blame it on the West' theme), here (short and sweet, calling for 'solidarity'), and here (from China Daily). The China Daily story required a bit of digging: it was buried deep within the 'World News' section, after stories covering Berlusconi's 'party girls,' Japan's whaling tradition, the DC metro train crash, and at least a dozen others. Go figure.

North Korea is going too far.... even for China

Until recent days China has rebuffed all U.S. and Japanese calls for more stringent sanctions against North Korea, in part weary of the consequences of a destabilized regime in Pyongyang. Perhaps even further to the point, China has in many ways been supportive of North Korea's missile testing, as suggested by Anne Applebaum in her recent op-ed:

Despite the risks, though, there are good reasons for the Chinese to prod Kim Jong Il to keep those missiles coming. By permitting North Korea to rattle its sabers, the Chinese can monitor President Obama's reaction to a military threat -- without having to deploy a threat themselves. They can see how serious the new American administration is about controlling the spread of nuclear weapons -- without having to risk sanctions or international condemnation of their own nuclear industry. They can distract and disturb the new administration -- without harming Chinese American economic relations, which are crucial to their own regime's stability. And if the game goes badly, they can call it off altogether.

While the Chinese are not quite yet willing to call if off altogether, there is reason to believe that they are growing increasingly frustrated by Kim's behavior. Not so much because it stands in clear defiance of attempted (though - if we're going to be perfectly honest - altogether meaningless) U.N. resolutions, but because an increasingly active North Korea will likely signal rapid military buildup in Japan, threatening stability in the region. North Korea's missile tests have also begun to step on the toes of the increasingly disgruntled Chinese leadership, leading one to believe that a change in Chinese policy may be nigh.

Zhu Feng's recent piece is the first sliver of evidence suggesting such a shift (or at the very least the possibility of one). The piece is significant not only for what it says, but also because of who is saying it: Zhu is a top dog in Beijing, serving as he does as the Deputy Director of the Center for International & Strategic Studies at Peking University. China, he writes, has long been of the opinion that North Korea's nuclear efforts was a negotiable item:

As long as its regime security and economic demands could be met, Pyongyang might be willing to give up its “nuclear car”. For the time being, it seems to me that all evidence points in the opposite direction. In fact, the recent nuclear testing by DPRK is not merely a slap in the Chinese face, but a sobering wake-up call for Chinese leadership to face up to the malign nature of their N. Korean counterparts.

This slap in the face may well "bring about the fundamental change of China's long-time policy of DPRK quickly." What this change will look like and what it will entail are not yet known. While I doubt that China will engage in measures such as the cutting off of oil and coal supplies, which would indubitably cripple the North Korean economy, it will find other ways to take a hard stand against North Korea's behavior. (Hopefully) it's just a matter of time. 

Note to China: sooner would be better than later.

New research on Sino-Timorese relations

A new report on China's relations with East Timor by Loro Horta has recently been published by France's Institut de Recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est Contemporaine (Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia). The report traces the alleged successes and limitations of China's strategy in East Timor and hopes to:

[...] shed some light not only on the intricacies of relations between the two countries, but also on China’s relations with other small, poor but resource rich countries like Timor-Leste. Finally it is the hoped by the author that the current article may give a modest contribution to the study of China’s foreign relations and its diplomacy in the developing world.

The report is written from quite an IR realist perspective, though does well to highlight several consistencies in China's "go out" policy and the nature of its bilateral relations with developing states, particularly insofar as its oil and energy, infrastructure, and technology investments are concerned.

Land grabs in poor countries: blessing or curse?

Apologies for my recent absence: I dashed off to Nantucket for the Memorial Day weekend and - to be perfectly frank - postponed my return to the 'real world' (for me part of which entails blogging) for as long as humanly possible thereafter. It was such a lovely time! Alas, one can only put off the inevitable for so long, so here I am: back at long last.

While doing a bit of sunbathing on the beach over the weekend, I happened to stumble across an excellent overview of the issues surrounding present-day land grabs (or "outsourcing's third wave") in last week's Economist. I wrote about this matter earlier this month when a similar story appeared in Canada's Globe & Mail, though I feel the Economist does a much better job of teasing out the issues at stake.

As the Economist piece aptly observes, land grabs are particularly common among countries that export capital but import food (think the U.S. and China, for instance). Countries such as these outsource their farm production to countries that need capital but have land to spare; the vast majority of which are found in Africa (see map). And while investments in foreign farms are not a new phenomenon, there are several factors that differentiate today's 'land grabs' from those of the past, foremost among which is the scale (in Sudan, for instance, South Korea has signed deals for 690, 000 hectares! Before, a 'big' land deal use to be around 100,000 hectares) and the fact that the investors are no longer private entities alone: governments (and their state-run enterprises) have now likewise taken to investing in global farmland. China, for instance, has set up 11 research stations in Africa to boost yields of staple crops, and has secured several large deals across the African continent.

Duncan Green writes: 

The obvious motives for the deals are the spike in food prices and the subsequent decision of governments in several key producer countries to restrict their exports, threatening the food security of food importing countries such as the Gulf states, China and South Korea (the main participants in the deals). However, water shortages are another, hidden driver. Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, the chairman of Nestlé, claims: “The purchases weren’t about land, but water. For with the land comes the right to withdraw the water linked to it, in most countries essentially a freebie that increasingly could be the most valuable part of the deal.” He calls it “the great water grab”.

According to a newly released report by the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, farmland investments in the past five years total approximately 2.5m hectares - equal to about half the arable land of the UK. Other estimates posit the total farmland investments in Africa, Latin America and Asia at over 15m hectares, about half the size of Italy. While supporters of such deals argue that they are a tool for development, providing new seeds, techniques and money for agriculture, mounting evidence suggests they produce quite the opposite effect, driving out local farmers and in many cases depriving poor people of access to land, water and other resources.

Among the many underlying problems is that of the conflict between customary and statutory laws in the countries where the investments are transpiring. Writes the Economist:

Host governments usually claim that the land they are offering for sale or lease is vacant or owned by the state. That is not always true. “Empty” land often supports herders who graze animals on it. Land may be formally owned by the state but contain people who have farmed it for generations. Their customary rights are recognised locally, but often not accepted in law, or in the terms of a foreign-investment deal.

So the deals frequently set one group against another in host countries and the question is how those conflicts get resolved. “If you want people to invest in your country, you have to make concessions,” says the spokesman for Kenya’s president. (He was referring to a deal in which Qatar offered to build a new port in exchange for growing crops in the Tana river delta, something opposed by local farmers and conservationists.) The trouble is that the concessions are frequently one-sided. Customary owners are thrown off land they think of as theirs. Smallholders have their arms twisted to sign away their rights for a pittance.

The mechanisms for averting such losses would entail measures such as respect for customary laws, stable property rights, and increased transparency surrounding the land deals (among countless others, to be sure!). The trouble is that the majority of the countries which are party to today's land investments lack these very mechanisms and have been struggling with them for quite some time; in many cases decades. A potential solution might be the formulation of some international code, though I'm not quite sure as to what that would look like or what, exactly, it would entail. It would appear that our best option presently remains one of 'wait and see.'

P.S.  I doubt that this falls into the category of 'land grabs,' but the story does speak to the increased prevalence of the phenomenon of giving away land: touched by Biden's speech to the Bosnian parliament last week, a local farmer and war veteran offered Biden a piece of his land as a gift. Go figure.

Dear Africa, We would like to invest. Sincerely, the U.S.A. (P.S. Just fix some things, first...)

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce today launched the Africa Business Initiative (ABI) intended to help bridge the investment gap between the United States and Africa. Together with Baird's Communications Management Consultants, ABI today also released a report entitled The Conversation Behind the Boardroom: How Corporate America Really Views Africa. Driving the study is the ever-perplexing question of why Africa has not attracted more attention from the U.S. business community.

The answer, it seems, is that Africa is attracting the attention of U.S. businessmen - particularly in the technology sectors, and particularly now more than ever - but the costs of investment (political instability, a general lack of a business-conducive framework, and a poorly defined rule of law, among others) continue to outweigh the potential profits to be reaped.

What would it take for corporate America to fully take the African plunge? In short: a stable political environment; an educated (African) workforce; a fair business environment; and improved infrastructure. Goodness! If this is, indeed, the wish list then any such investment may be a lonnng way off! Given that the Chinese seem to have little trouble with the continent's current state of affairs, too, many African states now have little incentive to reform so as to accommodate U.S. desires. If nothing else, such U.S. demands may well result in more African leaders 'looking East,' much to the disadvantage of American corporations.

Regardless, the report itself is quite interesting and forms the first part of a two-party study. Part two, The Public Sector Conversation, will be conducted over the next several months and will focus on African government responses to the corporate American responses put forward in the currently available study. This may be quite telling, indeed!

Lula in Beijing to "defend a new economic order"

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva arrived in Beijing today where it is expected that he and President Hu will strengthen bilateral relations between their two countries, promote oil contracts, strike deals on the sale of Embraer aircraft, and negotiate meat exports and biofuel for cars, among other top agenda items.

Already in March, China surpassed the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trade partner, and the trip seems to signal even further shifts in the global economic arena: namely, the U.S. out, China in. Or, perhaps more realistically - the U.S. down, but not (yet?) out; China up, and rising: 

"I think the trip that I am about to embark on... is one of the most important I am going on to defend a new economic order and a new commercial policy in the world," Lula told reporters before leaving Brazil.

Roberto Jaguaribe, a Brazilian foreign ministry official, said last week the trip represented a "reorganisation of the international scene" in which the top emerging economies were playing a bigger role in world affairs.

Among the more curious agenda items to be discussed between Lula and Hu is Lula's proposal that the countries conduct bilateral trade through each nation's currency, removing the U.S. dollar as an intermediary. Silva has been urging the end of the use of the American dollar in South American trade for some time now, suggesting such a move would reduce transaction costs for both exporters and importers, especially those operating on a smaller scale. Brazil and Argentina have agreed to trade with each other using their own currencies, and China and Argentina have likewise agreed to establish a 70 billion yuan ($10.24 billion) currency swap system that will enable trade between the two nations to be settled in Chinese currency. Might we be witnessing the gradual usurping of the U.S. dollar as the world's currency reserve by the Chinese yuan?

Such a reality may still be some way off, but the Chinese are slowly laying the ground for the yuan's ascendance, one bilateral negotiation at a time.

A sign of the times; dispatches from Ethiopia

Via Owen Abroad:

Here in Ethiopia it is common for little children to shout ferenj when they see a white face.  I am told that this comes from the Amharic word for a French person, ፈረንሳዊ (pronounced färänsawi), because French people were among the first white people Ethiopians had seen.

Today G and I were running down a dirt track through a small village and a small girl, about 4 years old, saw us running past.   She shouted,

China! China!

I heard the other day that there were two old men sitting on a hillside in north Wello, watching the Chinese labourers building a new road.   They were old-timers, who had fought against the Italians in 1935, and then watched the Italians build the first roads across the Blue Nile gorge and up to Eritrea. (”What have the Romans ever done for us?”)  As these men watched the Chinese roll out the tarmac, one of them said to the other:

The Italians are back. Only now they have narrower eyes.

Chris Blattman shared musings on this very shift in global influence - captured in the shouts of African children and casual conversations - in 2008.

My humanitarian crisis is bigger than your humanitarian crisis

Earlier this month I grumbled (ever so slightly) over the selective coverage of humanitarian crises in the mainstream press (I was then alluding to the dearth of coverage regarding Sri Lanka). Another case in point: Congo v. Darfur:

According to Julie Hollar of Fair and Accuracy in Reporting:

To put the death rate in perspective, at the peak of the Darfur crisis, the conflict-related death rate there was less than a third of the Congo’s, and by 2005 it had dropped to less than 4,000 per month. The United Nations has estimated some 300,000 may have died in total as a result of the years of conflict in Darfur; the same number die from the Congo conflict every six and a half months. 

And yet, in the New York Times, which covers the Congo more than most U.S. outlets, Darfur has consistently received more coverage since it emerged as a media story in 2004. The Times gave Darfur nearly four times the coverage it gave the Congo in 2006, while Congolese were dying of war-related causes at nearly 10 times the rate of those in Darfur. 

Hollar goes on to suggest several potential explanations underpinning such a media disparity, among them: journalist access to the conflict zone (or lack thereof); celebrity attention (or lack thereof, until recently); and U.S. political interests which, Hollar argues, are the foremost drivers of where the West happens to invest its attention. While there may be some merit to this claim, my understanding is that the crisis failed to attract much initial attention in the U.S. and beyond, which weakens her argument. Thoughts on this, anyone?

On a somewhat unrelated, albeit related note, Texas in Africa has a great post examining why the Congo remains an "anarchic war-zone" despite all humanitarian, Western, peacekeeping, democracy promotion, and celebrity awareness efforts. Definitely worth a read.