East Timor

A new take on the bottom (three) billion

Three billion individuals. That's the approximate number of people that would be scrapped if we were to eliminate the bottom 5% global GDP contributors, the vast majority of which are found in either Africa or Southeast Asia. 81 countries comprise this bottom 5%. Together they represent half of the 192 UN member states and nearly 43% of the world population.


What would the world look like without them? Via Strange Maps we are offered a glimpse:


















In reverse order of magnitude the 81 countries are:

Zimbabwe, Burundi, DR Congo, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Malawi, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Afghanistan, Togo, Guinea, Uganda, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Nepal, Myanmar (Burma), Rwanda, Mozambique, East Timor, the Gambia, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Lesotho, Ghana, Haiti, Tajikistan, the Comoros, Cambodia, Laos, Benin, Kenya, Chad, the Solomon Islands, Kyrgyzstan, India, Nicaragua, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe, Ivory Coast, Zambia, the Yemen, Cameroon, Djibouti, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nigeria, Guyana, the Sudan, Bolivia, Moldova, Honduras, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Bhutan, Egypt, Vanuatu, Tonga, Paraguay, Morocco, Syria, Swaziland, Samoa, Guatemala, Georgia, the Congo, Iraq, Armenia, Jordan, Cape Verde, the Maldives, Fiji and Namibia.


It is equally curious to note which countries are not included among the bottom 5%. Any surprises?

New research on Sino-Timorese relations

A new report on China's relations with East Timor by Loro Horta has recently been published by France's Institut de Recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est Contemporaine (Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia). The report traces the alleged successes and limitations of China's strategy in East Timor and hopes to:

[...] shed some light not only on the intricacies of relations between the two countries, but also on China’s relations with other small, poor but resource rich countries like Timor-Leste. Finally it is the hoped by the author that the current article may give a modest contribution to the study of China’s foreign relations and its diplomacy in the developing world.

The report is written from quite an IR realist perspective, though does well to highlight several consistencies in China's "go out" policy and the nature of its bilateral relations with developing states, particularly insofar as its oil and energy, infrastructure, and technology investments are concerned.