Anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa maybe really isn't

Well, add Algeria to the list (the ever-growing list of countries where anti-Chinese sentiment is high: Zambia, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola, Kenya....). Reports from Afrik.com suggest growing xenophobia against Chinese is now escalating in Algeria, where job seekers are blaming the country's growing unemployment rate on the increased number of emigrants living in the country and working for meager pay:

On Tuesday, a fight broke out between Algerians and Chinese, after a disagreement between an Algerian shopkeeper and a Chinese migrant worker in Algeria’s Bab Ezzouar district. According to reports, ten Chinese migrants were injured and two Chinese shops looted in the fight.

In July, an al-Qaeda-linked group threatened to target Chinese workers in north Africa, following June 26 Mass factory brawl between Han Chinese and Muslim Uighurs in southern China, where hundreds were killed. In response to the report, the Chinese embassy in Algiers urged all 50,000 Chinese who live and work in Algeria to be more aware of safety precautions.

Unfortunately such outbursts are popping up all over the place. In Zambia, the 2006 presidential election effectively turned on the Chinese presence, with opposition candidate Michael Sata vowing to expel all Chinese workers if elected. While he ended up losing the presidential seat, he did win in Lusaka and the Copperbelt - the two regions where the Chinese presence is most pronounced. Similar (albeit not political) dissatisfaction erupted in Lesotho last year, when rioters began attacking Chinese businesses; in Namibia this year with increased worker casualties; in Kenya, as the unemployment rate soars... And the beat goes on.

I'm inclined to suggest that such outbursts are not anti-Chinese outbursts per se, but rather symptoms of a much greater problem. With increased poverty, unemployment, a general lack of functioning institutions, it should come as little surprise that Africans are angry with those who appear to be exacerbating these pre-existing realities. There are, of course, serious concerns surrounding Chinese hiring practices for which the Chinese alone are responsible; at the same time, it seems that the burden of rising unemployment rests as much with African governments as it does with Chinese workers. Many governments have yet to implement policies regulating Chinese (or foreign more generally) entrepreneurship, or ones which might genuinely stimulate domestic economic activity. The underlying problem of all this xenophobia may indeed not be the Chinese themselves, but rather poor institutional environments with little opportunity for economic mobility and governments which are seemingly doing little about it. Indeed, it seems that there is more than just one issue at play here.

A correction

Much is being made of the Oriental Post, Botswana's first Chinese newspaper, about which I blogged in early June. The surrounding hype is, however, somewhat misleading. Last week, France 24's The Observers ran a story on the newspaper, heralding the arrival of "Africa's first Chinese newspaper." A similar kind enthusiasm was echoed in a post on Appfrica, and picked up by Bill Easterly and Blood and Milk's Alana Shaikh on their respective Twitter pages. My, how quickly news spreads!

Yet while the Post is Botswana's first Chinese newspaper, it surely is not the first in all of Africa. The Western African United Business Weekly, a Chinese newspaper run out of Lagos, Nigeria, has been in circulation since 2005. China Express has been publishing out of Johannesburg, South Africa (a SADC member), since 1994. And there may well be additional Chinese-language papers in other parts of the continent about which we are unaware. The Chinese community has been quite active in Cape Verde since the mid-1990s, for instance; I wouldn't be surprised if they have by now established a foothold in the country's print media.

While the Oriental Post further signals China's growing fascination with the African continent - and indeed the mass migration of Chinese to Africa - it is not novel in any way (save but signaling a significant intensifying of Sino-Botswanan relations). To state otherwise is, unfortunately, quite inaccurate.

China's ethnic turmoil

When we talk about polities marred by ethnic divisions and unequal modernization and economic growth, China is often not the first country that comes to mind. One is perhaps more inclined to picture a Nigeria or a Sudan, for instance. Yet ethnic tensions have been and remain among the defining features of the Middle Kingdom, which is why the recent unrest is rather unsurprising, though nevertheless quite upsetting.

From what I've been able to gather, no one appears to know exactly what triggered the Uighur violence. While some blame it on exiled Uighur Rebiya Kadeer, others suggest the violence was triggered by a brawl which took place in factory several weeks ago and has since escalated. Naturally, leaders in Beijing blame the West for masterminding the whole thing, though I find little basis for such accusations if for no other reason than the simple fact that the West has little political or strategic interest in China's Muslim community. There were/are twenty-two Uighurs captive in Gitmo, though I doubt the protests have anything to do with this. Rather, the strife seems to be a purely domestic matter, with a historically marginalized sector of the populace acting out against state policies that continue to leave them on the periphery of economic growth, especially since large numbers of Han Chinese have moved into the traditionally Muslim province and are usurping jobs from resident Uighurs.

Of course this is no justification for such awful acts of violence. Since the Uighur riots began on Sunday, 156 individuals have been killed and over 1,400 arrested in what is said to be the worst ethnic violence since the Cultural Revolution. Despite the fact that the population in Xinjiang comprises less than 1.5% of China's overall population, the State is heavily cracking down on the violence so as to preserve the "stability of the state," which is another way of saying 'One China'.

It is important to remember that Beijing's 'One China' policy is directed not only at Tibet and Taiwan, but any separatist movements, of which the Uighurs in Xinjiang are one. Many Chinese likewise uphold the notion of 'One China' which adds yet another element of complexity to the ongoing protests. One could say that the Uighurs are protesting against their marginalization and (perhaps symbolically) for separation, while the Han Chinese are protesting against the protests and for One China. In a curious way, these protests call into question the very notion of Han nationalism, which has long been regarded as a sort of ideological superglue holding together a united China. I seriously question the strength of this glue to begin with, but it seems to be wearing off - if it was even there to begin with.

As with the ongoing turmoil in Iran, the outcome of the unrest in Xinjiang is unclear. Fresh demonstrations have started in the capital Urumqi despite ongoing internet restrictions aimed at quelling the violence. Yet it does seem unlikely that all of this will amount to much. The government in Beijing certainly isn't likely to change its policies, and I don't know that the Uighurs are powerful enough as a group to continue with their tactics in the face of a powerful State. As was the case with 2008 Tibetan unrest, I sense that the protests may go on for a little while longer until the costs of violence will outweigh the benefits and all will be calm (at least on the exterior) once again. After all, the 60th anniversary of the Chinese Communist takeover is fast approaching and the CCP has other matters to tend to. Dealing with an ethnic minority who resents the loss of its culture, freedom and the ability to determine its future is not one of them.

photo credit: UK Times

Kenya's jua kali and Chinese businesses - and a shameless plug

Yours truly has a paper published in the July 2009 issue of the Journal of Eastern African Studies on the nature of Chinese business networks in Kenya. The paper can be found here (subscription required).

On the creative benefits of an expat existence

Living abroad gives individuals greater creativity in problem solving, according to a study published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 

[...] William Maddux of INSEAD, a business school in Fontainebleau, France, and Adam Galinsky, of the Kellogg School of Management in Chicago, presented 155 American business students and 55 foreign ones studying in America with a test used by psychologists as a measure of creativity. Given a candle, some matches and a box of drawing pins, the students were asked to attach the candle to a cardboard wall so that no wax would drip on the floor when the candle was lit. (The solution is to use the box as a candleholder and fix it to the wall with the pins.) They found 60% of students who were either living abroad or had spent some time doing so, solved the problem, whereas only 42% of those who had not lived abroad did so.

As it turns out, it's not just that more creative people are more likely to live abroad; the study's authors controlled for personality traits that are known to predict creativity, leading them to conclude that "it is something from the experience of living in foreign parts that helps foster creativity." Finally - statistical justification of my chosen path of existence!

You can find the complete study findings here.

[HT: Freakanomics]

A sign of the times; dispatches from Ethiopia

Via Owen Abroad:

Here in Ethiopia it is common for little children to shout ferenj when they see a white face.  I am told that this comes from the Amharic word for a French person, ፈረንሳዊ (pronounced färänsawi), because French people were among the first white people Ethiopians had seen.

Today G and I were running down a dirt track through a small village and a small girl, about 4 years old, saw us running past.   She shouted,

China! China!

I heard the other day that there were two old men sitting on a hillside in north Wello, watching the Chinese labourers building a new road.   They were old-timers, who had fought against the Italians in 1935, and then watched the Italians build the first roads across the Blue Nile gorge and up to Eritrea. (”What have the Romans ever done for us?”)  As these men watched the Chinese roll out the tarmac, one of them said to the other:

The Italians are back. Only now they have narrower eyes.

Chris Blattman shared musings on this very shift in global influence - captured in the shouts of African children and casual conversations - in 2008.

Chinatown, Angola

A superb video from Current TV examining the growing presence of Chinese in Angola. While the video's focus remains largely on China's infrastructure projects across the country, it nevertheless does a great job touching upon the variety of sectors in which the Chinese have become quite active. The video itself is somewhat lengthy, but certainly worth a viewing for those seeking to gain a better sense of 'China in Africa' (or Angola, as the case may be):

HT: Africa is a Country

A 21st century scramble for African land

A reader from the University of Toronto alerted me to the following article in Tuesday's Globe and Mail on the issue of land acquisition in Africa:

Wealthy foreign investors have acquired, or begun negotiating for, an estimated 15 to 20 million hectares of farmland in the developing world – equal to roughly half the size of Newfoundland and Labrador – since 2006. Most of this is in Africa, where the soil is fertile, costs are low and the owners are weak.

Critics are calling it a “global land grab” with neocolonial overtones. The African Union has warned that Africans could be exploited by the massive farmland deals because of their weak bargaining position. Overwhelmed by the rapidly developing trend, they are failing to get sufficient benefits in return, the AU says.

The buyers and leasers of African farmland are the rich and powerful (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates) or the hugely populous and land-hungry (China and India). For all of them, Africa is the jackpot, a region where vast tracts of land are cheap and underutilized.

Madagascar, one of the poorest countries in the world, is a prime target of those hungry for land. But there are plenty of other African targets, too. China is seeking 2 million hectares in Zambia to grow crops for biofuels. Saudi Arabian investors are spending $100-million to acquire land in Ethiopia, $45-million for land in Sudan, and millions more for 500,000 hectares in Tanzania. Libya has secured 100,000 hectares in Mali to grow rice. Qatar has obtained 40,000 hectares in Kenya.

The land deals are a sign of a shift in the world's priorities. Farmland is becoming as much of a strategic resource as oil fields.

The issue is admittedly one about which I am not too well educated, though now realize I ought to be: implicit in the notion of 'China in Africa' (i.e. the arrival of Chinese in Africa) is the question of how they are acquiring land! Obviously! While the article tends to focus on larger-scale investors, I'd venture to guess that the matter is even more pronounced on the micro scale, with entrepreneurs scrambling for spaces from which to run their shops, restaurants, etc. Chinese in Africa tend not to be particularly active in any farmland activities at present, so my guess is that much of their 'land grabs' center around urban areas. That said, I wouldn't be surprised if they began to diversify their interests in the not too distant future. This may well be worth looking into in greater detail.

Can you please define 'win-win?'

Chinese officials constantly refer to their relations with African states as "win-win," implying some sort of profound reciprocity and mutual (economic, social) benefit (another favored catch phrase). While some Chinese firms in Africa certainly do serve to benefit the local economies, particularly insofar as infrastructure and (limited) employment are concerned, the catch is that they are in Africa. You don't hear much about African firms in China or an influx of African goods into the Chinese market, save with few exceptions (i.e. most recently Ugandan coffee).

It appears that times are growing to be even more difficult for African entrepreneurs seeking to make a profit in China. The most recent hurdle is a visa crackdown imposed by the Chinese government which has not only rendered doing business complicated, but has brought Guangzhou's Chocolate City - China's largest African population - to a breaking point:

The country’s faltering economy is putting the squeeze on “Little Africa,” or “Chocolate City,” as locals call it. Numbers are down and business is suffering. All-important visas are being denied or granted only for the short term. Africans who allow their visas to expire — and many do — are often imprisoned and forced to pay a hefty fine.

In January, the Chinese government announced a crackdown on foreigners living illegally in Guangzhou, and, according to interviews with more than two dozen Africans working in the city, the community is facing increased persecution at the hands of police.

Wonderful. So while Chinese entrepreneurs make money in Africa, Africans must seemingly bend over backwards and jump countless hurdles to do the same in China. Win-win? Really?

Public vs. private Chinese investment in Africa

I received an email several days ago which raised an important question regarding the breakdown of public versus private Chinese investments in Africa (and arguably elsewhere). I've had it in my mind to respond for quite some time, but failed to do so for lack of a proper (concise) response. The query reads as follows:

What is the mix of private/public investment coming from China?  It seems like that is a critical element to understanding how strategic the investment is.  Private firms seem like the ones that are more prone to pulling out in rough market conditions because they are more focused on returns, whereas the Chinese government can endlessly make strategic investments in China without regard to short-run cost.

Unfortunately the question is one to which there presently isn't a clear answer. There exists a significant mix of both public and private ventures, with a key differentiating factor being scale of the enterprise. On the macro level, state-owned firms like China Road and Bridge Corp., China Non-Ferrous Mining Corp (NFC), China Railway Engineering Corp. and others are building roads, bridges, prospecting for oil and engaging in natural resource extraction. As the enquiry rightly notes, firms such as these enjoy significant financial backing from the Chinese government (in nearly 90% of cases through the Export-Import Bank of China), have great leverage over Western (largely private) firms, and are poised to make risky investments. 

On a smaller scale, allegedly private Chinese entrepreneurs are infiltrating African urban cities, establishing shops, restaurants, beauty parlors and other quintessentially Chinese businesses (think Chinatown in San Francisco or New York, for instance). There was an interesting dossier posted on this topic in Africans in China last week, actually. The topic is also addressed in the recent issue of the China Review.

What's interesting about these seemingly "private" firms however, is that it's unclear as to how "private" they really are. There is some evidence to suggest that many of such entrepreneurs are actually being groomed by (and are arms of) provincial Chinese governments. In Fujian, for instance, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office assumes responsibility for providing technical and skills training to would-be overseas entrepreneurs. The would-bes acquire skills and undertake ventures overseas; their remittances are then used to spur (Chinese) provincial development. It's unclear as to how many "private" Chinese firms abide by such a model, though it is rather curious that many of such businesses are holding their ground despite the economic downturn. 

So I suppose the long and short of the answer is: I don't know, and I'm not sure anyone presently does (if someone reading this does - shout!). The private sector is gaining ground in China, and "private" firms are indeed investing abroad. Yet I remain skeptical that they are entirely removed from CCP oversight. It would certainly be interesting to find out. 

The beginning of the end of 'China in Africa'? Hardly.

I received an email from a friend yesterday directing me to this publication in the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief, and enquiring as to whether the end of 'China in Africa' (the phenomenon, not the blog!) might be on the horizon. I've opted to respond publicly, as this is not the first time that the question has crossed my desk.

The short answer is: no. 

In the Jamestown piece, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills argue that the commodity price decline has adversely affected African export prices and growth, and subsequently African relations with China. They cite the withdrawal of Chinese entrepreneurs from Zambia and the Congo, and an overall Chinese strategic retreat from the continent, in turn suggesting that the market - and not grand strategy - is the main Chinese motivation in Africa. 

While this may be true to an extent, I fear that Herbst and Mills are overstating their claim. While some Chinese entrepreneurs have migrated out of Africa, Beijing continues to aggressively pursue its African relations, regarding the reality of a now waning West as the ideal opportunity to strengthen its influence across the continent. In the last month alone China has:

• Signed a $280 million deal with Mauritania to extend the port at Nouakchott 
• Agreed to build a hospital in Nairobi
• Offered $77 million to Uganda in a renewed bid to boost the East African country's development
• Installed government internet in Senegal
• Signed an aid and cooperation agreement to further ties with Rwanda
• Signed a 2.6 billion agreement to develop Liberia's iron ore mine, the biggest ever investment in the West African nation
• Signed another agreement (the Chinese do love their agreements!) with Nigerian Communications Satellite Limited to replace the nation's first communications satellite, which failed in orbit in November 2008
• Secured a $1 billion loan to Angola
• And built a national radio and television broadcast building in Congo

What's more, the floundering China-Congo deal Herbst and Mills cite is faltering not because of declining growth and commodity prices, as they suggest, but rather because western donors are threatening to renege on their promises of relief on the country's historic debt of $11bn if the Congo accepts Chinese financing on commercial terms. According to Barney Jopson in today's FT:

The focus of concern, according to western diplomats in Kinshasa, is that the deal would give the Chinese consortium unprecedented state financial guarantees, including some that earmark government revenues and make China a privileged creditor[...]

Trade between China and Africa is at an all time high. Hu Jintao is touring the continent this week, stressing the importance of Sino-African ties and shoring up African good sentiment. Deals continue to be signed. And this is meant to be the end? No, I'm afraid this is only the beginning.

More on Chocolate City (Africans in China, that is...)

Earlier this week I posted on Evan Osnos' New Yorker piece documenting the mushrooming African population in parts of China ("African" used loosely here, of course. A large percentage of the population informing Osnos' piece is actually Nigerian). Following suit, the most recent issue of the China Monitor, a publication of the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, is dedicated to precisely this subject matter. How delightful when things work in tandem like so!

China and…Egypt?

A colleague recently forwarded me an interesting post appearing on Global Voices on the Chinese presence in Egypt:

"Knocks on the door. She told me in broken Arabic: "Wanna buy something Chinese?"

I would normally say: "No, thanks" to them and close the door … But this time my house was full of people so I asked her to come in.

She put the bag she was carrying with her on the floor and started to show me the goods she had. Tablecloths, cloths and cosmetics. I was looking at her, with a lot of questions inside me. Not about what she sold as it's known since they started to invade the country by themselves rather than exporting their goods to us only. But what forced her to do such hard job, and travel away from her homeland with a backpack like a camel hump…"

The post goes on to observe that the Chinese are the only people who will go door to door, arriving in poor countries and selling poor goods. With an estimated 300 million poor in China, however, such desperate manifestations of capitalism are anything but surprising.

Chinatown, Paris.

I have entered that phase enjoyed by every grad student where there is suddenly a light at the end of the tunnel. Albeit quite dim, I am beginning to see the end to my dissertation writing. Thank goodness! To be fair, I'm greatly enjoying this project of thesis writing, as it's allowed me to immerse myself into the cultural and entrepreneurial practices of the overseas Chinese, and come to a greater understanding of issues of migration, identity, and small-scale entrepreneurism, among many others.

The chapter I'm currently working on is the framing chapter, attempting to situate Chinese migration to Africa in comparative perspective. It should come as no surprise that the Chinese are a widely dispersed group, with Chinatowns and ethnic enclaves all over the globe. This reality makes writing both easy and incredibly difficult. Writer's block aside, I am coming to grasp the pervasiveness of Chinese migrant communities. Even where no Chinatowns analogous to those in San Francisco or NYC exist, the Chinese presence cannot - and has not - been ignored.

Such is the case in Paris, where the first French-Chinese man is running for mayor of Paris' 13th district. About 20% of residents in the 13th arrondissement are of Asian origin, representing some 30, 000 people. Nationwide, there are an estimated half-million people of Asian decent. Paris' Chinatown is the biggest in all of Europe.

The 37 year-old Wu is seemingly running on a platform of "let the Asians be seen," calling in part for the building of Chinese gates similar to those that adorn Chinatown in San Francisco, such that "a visitor should know he is in Chinatown." Charming though this concern may be, my hunch is that delimiting Chinatown for Parisian tourists is about as far down the list of concerns as one can get. In a country of increasing multiculturalism the primary concern is with the persistence of the Asian identity and the maintenance of closely formed networked communities.

While fancy gates and overt signs of "Chineseness" aren't particularly necessary to accomplish such ends, they surely never hurt. Like many immigrant communities, the Chinese carry with them a strong sense of identity. Many continue to reside among their own people, with only minimal contact with the host society. They partake in cultural associations - recreational, political and/or cultural - which are often linked to organizations in Mainland China, and maintain close ties with family and friends in China. Such activities are typical of many overseas migrants, but are particularly unique among the Chinese in that they persist beyond the initial stages of migration.

In the Bay Area in California, for instance, many signs over banks, restaurants and other public services are now in Mandarin and English - this, in areas outside of San Francisco's Chinatown. The Chinese initially arrived in California in the 1850s and have held on to their identity since. Similar patterns can be observed across much of North America and Europe. France is the latest case in point.

Why do I bring this up? While it's far too early to speak of such developments in the African context, the Parisian case suggests that the Chinese presence in Africa may in the long-term alter the continent's identity and politics. The establishment of China City in Joburg, South Africa, is perhaps the first step en route to this reality. I am not here laying any normative claims on such developments, but am merely bringing them to the attention of those to whom this is of interest. The possibility of 'Chinatown, Africa' is yet another among many considerations in the puzzle that is China-in-Africa.

Global migration becoming hot button issue

The recent edition of The Economist has a fantastic special report on global migration, emphasizing many points particularly salient to South-South population movements. Third World migration has for a long time been ignored, but is quickly making its way into the spotlight as scholars and policymakers alike are beginning to recognize its potential developmental implications. 

According to some statistics, approximately 80% of China's inward FDI comes from its overseas migrants. Indeed, the PRC's central and local governments place particular emphasis on the role of overseas Chinese in developing the country's provinces. Similar policies apply in other developing countries, making the need to track and understand South-South migration that much more essential. 

And suddenly, we want the Chinese to stay

A journalist colleague of mine, Ms. Dominique Patton, has for the past few months been covering Chinese business activity in Eastern Africa. Her most recent piece in Business Daily (based in Nairobi) discusses Kenya's dwindling tourist figures since the 27 December election, and the drastic impact this is having on the Kenyan economy (approximately 59% of Kenya's GDP is derived from the service sector, of which tourism forms a significant part).

While the Chinese tourist market is much smaller than the US or UK, it is nevertheless and important emerging market. Many Chinese tourists, too, are not tourists in the traditional sense but come to survey market opportunities; many end up staying and making significant investments in Kenya's various industry sectors. 60% of Chinese tourists are, indeed, business travelers. 

While general African concern regarding the Chinese speaks to there being 'too many,' it appears that Kenyan concerns may now be of there being 'not enough.' Amidst the plethora of mixed feelings regarding Chinese presence in the country - indeed the continent - it appears that today the prospect of the Chinese leaving Kenya (or not even arriving) is a much more daunting prospect than their being there in the first place. It would appear that Africa needs China more than we (or at least I) might have imagined, and a new era of African dependency may be upon us. 

A global trek to poor nations, from poorer ones

My interest in Chinese migration led me to two articles published in the NYTimes. In the first, Thomas Fuller tells us that cheap Chinese goods are improving livelihoods worldwide. Concerns over product safety such as those prevalent in the West are essentially moot in countries such as Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam where national purchasing power is generally low, and to own a cheap television or cooking utensil is alone a luxury. 

This is true not only in Asia, but in Africa as well: cheap Chinese goods are infiltrating markets from Kenya to South Africa and Zimbabwe. While the quality of these goods is much like the price (low) and the ramifications on local industries remains somewhat dubious, there is an upside. Indeed, the influx of such goods is increasing the purchasing power of citizens all over Africa. More than that, it is connecting them to a world beyond their own. With Western and domestic products becoming increasingly too expensive, chances are high that cheap Chinese goods will continue to dominate markets across Asia and Africa - perhaps even long after citizens will be able to afford something better. 

Related to this phenomenon is a piece by Jason DeParle telling us that there are an estimated 74 million 'south-south' migrants making the trek from "poorer to poor" countries. Though his article focuses primarily on the Dominican Republic, it speaks of a much wider phenomenon - one of which contemporary Sino-African relations form a significant part. Indeed, once one looks beyond China's 'oil-for-aid' diplomacy and its pursuit of resources, the China-in-Africa phenomenon is analogous to what DeParle describes: Chinese migrants seeking jobs and better wages; some coming for seasonal work, and others putting down roots.