A move in the right direction

Today marks the end of Clinton's Asia tour, which ended with a two-day visit in Beijing. Where I was  previously skeptical over the direction in which Clinton's visit might move U.S.-China relations - given especially her earlier biting denunciations of China's human rights record and general Chinese suspicion of Clinton herself - it appears that she may have done America proud: 
Mrs Clinton was careful to demonstrate concern for human rights, visiting a church on Sunday morning and holding a session with a group of prominent women. But by signaling before she arrived that human rights “cannot interfere” with economic and diplomatic priorities, she told China’s leaders what they wanted to hear – that whatever gets said about China on the campaign trail, Washington believes the relationship between the two countries is too important to jeopardise.
Now that's what I call 'smart power.' 

For the full story, see Sunday's issue of the FT.

Public vs. private Chinese investment in Africa

I received an email several days ago which raised an important question regarding the breakdown of public versus private Chinese investments in Africa (and arguably elsewhere). I've had it in my mind to respond for quite some time, but failed to do so for lack of a proper (concise) response. The query reads as follows:
What is the mix of private/public investment coming from China?  It seems like that is a critical element to understanding how strategic the investment is.  Private firms seem like the ones that are more prone to pulling out in rough market conditions because they are more focused on returns, whereas the Chinese government can endlessly make strategic investments in China without regard to short-run cost.
Unfortunately the question is one to which there presently isn't a clear answer. There exists a significant mix of both public and private ventures, with a key differentiating factor being scale of the enterprise. On the macro level, state-owned firms like China Road and Bridge Corp., China Non-Ferrous Mining Corp (NFC), China Railway Engineering Corp. and others are building roads, bridges, prospecting for oil and engaging in natural resource extraction. As the enquiry rightly notes, firms such as these enjoy significant financial backing from the Chinese government (in nearly 90% of cases through the Export-Import Bank of China), have great leverage over Western (largely private) firms, and are poised to make risky investments. 

On a smaller scale, allegedly private Chinese entrepreneurs are infiltrating African urban cities, establishing shops, restaurants, beauty parlors and other quintessentially Chinese businesses (think Chinatown in San Francisco or New York, for instance). There was an interesting dossier posted on this topic in Africans in China last week, actually. The topic is also addressed in the recent issue of the China Review.

What's interesting about these seemingly "private" firms however, is that it's unclear as to how "private" they really are. There is some evidence to suggest that many of such entrepreneurs are actually being groomed by (and are arms of) provincial Chinese governments. In Fujian, for instance, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office assumes responsibility for providing technical and skills training to would-be overseas entrepreneurs. The would-bes acquire skills and undertake ventures overseas; their remittances are then used to spur (Chinese) provincial development. It's unclear as to how many "private" Chinese firms abide by such a model, though it is rather curious that many of such businesses are holding their ground despite the economic downturn. 

So I suppose the long and short of the answer is: I don't know, and I'm not sure anyone presently does (if someone reading this does - shout!). The private sector is gaining ground in China, and "private" firms are indeed investing abroad. Yet I remain skeptical that they are entirely removed from CCP oversight. It would certainly be interesting to find out. 

Confessions of a (Chinese) shopaholic

I didn't see the film, nor have I ever read the book, but am quite certain that the title (at the very least) nevertheless does well to encompass China's latest buying spree: 
Squeezed between falling profits and the credit crunch, a growing number of troubled corporations and countries are turning to cash-rich China for a bailout. And with foreign assets cheaper than they have been for years, Beijing is going on an international spending spree.
It appears that while the Chinese economy has also been hit by the crisis, the Chinese banks have not been so badly damaged, and policy banks seem ready to lend. And lend they are. 

Last week, the Chinese government signed a landmark $10bn agreement with Brazil that will ensure long-term supplies of oil to China while delivering much-needed financial assistance to help Brazil develop oil and gas reserves recently discovered in coastal waters. Also last week, China signed off  on $25bn in loans for Russia in return for oil supplies from newly discovered fields in Siberia for the next twenty years. Venezuela will likewise supply Beijing with up to 1 million barrels per day by 2015 in return for $6bn from China to top up an existing development fund. Indeed, not only is China taking full advantage of the economic downturn, but it is quickly assuming the role of Global Lender Extraordinaire.

I must say, however, China's " loans-for-oil" policy reminds me in part of the now infamous Oil for Food Programme. While I trust that Chinese loan money is being employed for its intended purposes, I would be shocked - shocked! - if at least a small portion of it wasn't unlawfully being diverted to help prop up recipient regimes. And when the recipient regimes are states like Russia and Venezuela, it would be a miracle indeed if  that weren't the case.

U.S.-China cooperation on energy and climate change

Among the many topics Secretary of State Clinton hopes to discuss during her upcoming trip to China (the last leg of her current Asia tour) is U.S.-China cooperation on climate change. A rather timely topic given that China is now the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and has considerable clout in determining the likely direction of global attempts to deal with the issue.

That said, there arise many questions over what U.S-China cooperation in this respect might actually look like. What are the particulars? Luckily for all those who ponder such things, a scientific task force run jointly by the Asia Society's Center on U.S-China Relations and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change has worked to compile specific recommendations. The press release can be found here; an overview here; and the PDF of the report in English here. 

Organic in China

Earlier this week I posted on a fantastic story in the WSJ's China Journal about organic pig farming in China (I know: it sounds ridiculous, but work with me on this one). While I may have chuckled slightly at the venture, it appears that it's actually part and parcel of a blossoming organic food industry that's taking off across the country. 

Jordan Calinoff in GlobalPost writes: 
Without much fanfare, China has in recent years revolutionized organic farming. Between 2000 and 2006, China jumped from 45th position to second worldwide in the amount of land under organic management. In 2006 alone, China added a staggering 12 percent to the world’s organically farmed land.
Who would have thought? If the trend continues, it may potentially lead to cheaper organic produce worldwide (hooray!), and may likewise have far-reaching social consequences inside China. Most obviously, it may be the first among many steps in the improvement of food safety (and goodness knows how badly that is needed), and may also go some way in alleviating the burden of unemployment faced by the country's migrant workers:
As millions of unemployed migrant factory workers stream back to the countryside in search of work, the increased revenue from organic food — it sells at twice the price of conventional produce — could help ease that labor transition.
The industry does, of course, have some hurdles to overcome (think: government regulation, authenticity of allegedly 'organic' produce, farming woes more generally), but appears to be the next 'it' thing among the country's younger generation. 


(On the topic of organic goodness, do you know who owns Trader Joe's? You really do learn something new everyday!)

The ties that bind

On his tour through Africa, President Hu Jintao stopped in Mauritius where he spoke at the Chinese Culture Center and emphasized the salience of 'cultural exchanges' between the two countries (and arguably Africa more broadly) in fostering friendly and beneficial relations:
“Learning Chinese will pave the way for better exchanges between Chinese and Mauritian people,” he said.
The Chinese Center in Mauritius is the first of such Chinese ventures (or so the article claims; I hesitate to believe that wholeheartedly). There, eager members can learn Chinese martial arts, dance, and language. Chinese language has also become part of the curricular framework in Mauritius. Goodness: if that doesn't drive home the growing importance of China for Africa, then I don't know what does!

To be perfectly honest, I don't quite know what to think about such overt emphasis on Chinese culture in Africa. On the one hand, it most certainly is useful. Much of the reason that Chinese firms in Africa hire their fellow compatriots is precisely because of the language barrier with locals. Similarly, when they are hired, local workers generally remain confined to manual labor positions with little opportunity for upward mobility. If you can't speak the language then what's the point, right?  Given that Chinese continue to stream into the continent at an astounding rate, a 'cultural exchange' of sort does seem like a logical enterprise. 

Yet two things bother me. First, I haven't heard any African leaders calling for such cultural exchanges. I mean, really calling for them; not just doing so because the Chinese are. I could be wrong and there may well be some who do, but I'm personally not aware of any. For now, the stress on Chinese culture comes from - *gasp* - the Chinese! It wouldn't behoove them to learn about the various African cultures, I suppose? Secondly, is it just me or does all of this ring of colonialism? The imposition of socio-cultural, religious and linguistic structures on an indigenous people? It's all a bit too familiar.

So today's million dollar question: cultural exchanges - friend or foe?

And that's a wrap

Much of the hype surrounding China's Charter '08 - a democracy manifesto calling for reform of the Chinese political system - has seemingly died. It caught nearly no attention in Western media outlets (sadly), and after its initial erratic reaction, the CCP seemingly forgot all about it, too (seemingly, being the operative word here). I guess there won't be much of a grassroots rebellion, after all. 

What the Charter did, do, however, was to spark interesting debate among both Chinese and Western scholars on the future of Chinese politics. Here,  Xujun Eberlein offers an interesting summary of the buzz surrounding the Charter. Apparently, it even caught the attention of the Falun Gong:
More curious, and changing, reactions, came from Falun Gong, or FLG, a religious and political group that has been banned in mainlandChina. A search on FLG's Chinese language website Sunday came up with 100 links cheering "Charter 08," with titles such as "Reform Is Dead, Long Live Revolution!" However a click on any of those links gave only a blank page. Remnants of posts here and there indicate that FLG originally found "Charter 08" an exciting sign of the coming revolution and supported it whole-heartedly. Later, though, they made a 180 degree turn after the FLG leader deemed the manifesto not revolutionary enough, but rather a "ghost shadow" of the communist party
Be sure to read the comments section of the post too - it's nearly as fascinating as the post itself.

Pig farming in China (aka. offbeat post of the week...)


The WSJ's China Journal has a rather hilarious (though entirely serious) piece about a company in China - Netease.com Inc - whose latest business venture is pig farming. Yes, pig farming. And as though that wasn't enough, the company will focus on raising livestock with strictly organic diets. And the pigs will be toilet trained (not sure how that works, exactly. Are there any farmers reading who might be willing to share some insights?). This is oh so very progressive, I can't hardly stand it.

Speaking to the motivation behind this venture, Ding Lei, founder and CEO of the company cites food safety:
The company hopes to draw greater attention to agricultural development in a country that has had several recent food scares. More specifics of the plan will be disclosed in April.
In all seriousness, this may well prove to be a most worthwhile health venture, especially in light of the most recent baby milk scandal (among countless other similar cases), with wide-ranging implications.

What I can't quite wrap my head around, though, is the proposed online social network for farmers (think Facebook for pig farmers), through which farmers will be able to exchange breeding techniques and other information pertinent to the appropriate raising of pigs (whatever that may entail). While no doubt useful in theory, I doubt that many pig farmers frequent such sites  - or use the internet at all, for that matter. But then again, what do I know about pig farmers in China? Right. Nothing.

Shameless self-advertisement

Yours truly is published in the recent issue of The China Review, a publication of the Great Britain-China Centre. The piece is on Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa's informal economies - an aspect of 'China in Africa' which I argue has been largely overlooked by much mainstream scholarship. Barring the slightly incorrect biography at the end of the piece (I am no longer a Research Assistant at Oxford), the piece reads as it was meant to. Happy reading!

It's an international law miracle!

The Khmer Rouge Tribunal is actually trying someone. Today. For the first time. Ever. Better later than never, I suppose.

Kaing Guek Eav - more commonly known as Duch (charming) is the first ultra-Maoist to be tried. Duch was the director of the notorious torture center S21 (he was the Head Torture Chief. No, really), where approximately 17,000 of the regime's enemies were tortured and exterminated. In total, 1.7 million people died between 1975 and 1979.

Today's hearing is largely procedural, with the main hearings due to start next month and a verdict expected by September. Hundreds of people allegedly filled the public gallery today, including Buddhist monks, diplomats and survivors from the era, in what marks a important step for justice in Cambodia. Many, however, remain skeptical over the legitimacy of the trial, as concerns about corruption and political interference continue to grow. The Cambodian judges have the majority in all chambers and, well, let's be honest, the Cambodian judiciary isn't exactly know for its independence (many human rights organizations have questioned the efficiency of the Tribunal, for instance Human Rights Watch).

In any event, this is an interesting (and quite monumental) judicial experiment, and it can only be hoped that it helps the Cambodian people come to terms with their past.

Hu, the Chinese Santa Claus

Today concludes Hu Jinato's 'magical mystery tour' across Africa ('magical' for all the 'gifts' Hu left behind; 'mystery' because, well, much of Chinese foreign policy remains precisely that). Despite the economic downturn and decreased demand for African resources, Hu did his best to persuade African leaders that China cares. 

In a speech in Tanzania, to which China has now promised substantial aid, Hu stated that: 
During times of adversity, it is all the more important for China and Africa to support each other, work in concert and tide over the difficulties together [...] As for problems that may arise from our cooperation, we want to properly resolve them through consultations with our African friends on an equal footing so as to maintain the larger interests of our friendly cooperation
How "friendly" this cooperation actually is for Africans, bypassing the political hacks sitting in Chinese-built mansions (a general overstatement, of course, but it does well to drive the point home), remains uncertain. With increasing numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs moving into cities across the continent, Chinese companies driving out indigenous firms - in both the formal and informal economic sectors - and dubious labor conditions maintained in cases where Africans are hired, protests continue to mount. In a bow to this reality, Hu repeated support for Chinese companies to "to shoulder more social responsibilities and forge amicable relations with the local communities."

He said as much after the riots at Chambishi mine in Zambia, as well as on several other occasions. Only minor improvements in labor conditions and 'friendly cooperation' have been reported. Umpteenth time's a charm?

Hi ho, hi ho, it's off to China (Clinton) goes

Hilary Clinton today begins her first trip abroad as secretary of state, on an Asian tour intended to strengthen U.S.-Asia, and particularly U.S-China,  relations. While discussions will focus primarily on economic matters (and for good reason!), Clinton also hopes to spur dialogue on the topic of climate change with the Chinese, who have now become the world's biggest emitters of greenhouse gases (for a slightly more detailed outline of Clinton's goals, see here).

This will likely be an interesting trip, both for personal and policy reasons. If you recall, both Obama and Clinton used China as a punching bag during the presidential primaries, and the Chinese have been a bit wary of her ever since - and arguably before then, too.  During the 1995 U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women, she blasted China for its atrocious human rights record, a topic about which she remains particularly passionate. That said, this trip could either do well to move U.S-China relations in a positive direction.... or do quite the opposite.

China (and Africa) in the U.S. Annual Threat Assessment

For those of you who don't have a bourgeoning interest in the American intelligence community as I apparently do (this is an entirely new development - much to the surprise of those who know me well, myself included!), a brief little back-grounder is in order.  Every year the national intelligence chief (now Dennis Blair) presents an Annual Threat Assessment report to Congress, compiled from analytical judgments of all the U.S. intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA.

This year's report was presented last Thursday, and included some interesting passages on China (see pp. 22-23 of the report), as well as on China's impact in Africa (pp. 34-5). While the link to the report for some reason doesn't appear to be working, the wonderful people over at The China Beat managed to get their hands on the pertinent sections. 

With respect to China specifically, the report notes: 
We judge China’s international behavior is driven by a combination of domestic priorities, primarily maintaining economic prosperity and domestic stability, and a longstanding ambition to see China play the role of a great power in East Asia and globally. Chinese leaders view preserving domestic stability as one of their most important internal security challenges. Their greatest concerns are separatist unrest and the possibility that local protests could merge into a coordinated national movement demanding fundamental political reforms or an end to Party rule. Security forces move quickly and sometimes forcefully to end demonstrations. The March 2008 protests in Tibet highlighted the danger of separatist unrest and prompted Beijing to deploy paramilitary and military assets to end the demonstrations.

These same domestic priorities are central to Chinese foreign policy. China’s desire to secure access to the markets, commodities, and energy supplies needed to sustain domestic economic growth significantly influences its foreign engagement. Chinese diplomacy seeks to maintain favorable relations with other major powers, particularly the US, which Beijing perceives as vital to China’s economic success and to achieving its other strategic objectives. But Beijing is also seeking to build its global image and influence in order to advance its broader interests and to resist what it perceives as external challenges to those interests or to China’s security and territorial integrity.

Taiwan as an area of tension in US-China relations has substantially relaxed since the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou. The new Taiwanese President inaugurated in May has resumed dialogue with Beijing after a nine-year hiatus, and leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are now cautiously optimistic that a new period of less confrontational relations has begun. Many outstanding challenges remain, however, and the two sides eventually will need to confront issues such as Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Beijing has not renounced the use of force against the island, and China’s leaders see maintaining the goal of unification as vital to regime legitimacy.
And on Chinese engagement in Africa:
China’s presence has grown substantially over the past decade. Total bilateral trade between China and the continent has increased from less than $4 billion in 1995 to $100 billion in 2008, but the EU and US still remain far larger economic partners for the region. China’s objectives are to secure access to African markets and natural resources, isolate Taiwan, and enhance its international stature, all of which it has made progress on. Nevertheless, China’s role has generated local resentment as Chinese firms are seen as undercutting African competitors in securing commercial contracts and falling short of standard local labor practices. Moreover, there is little discernible evidence of Chinese investments being used to incorporate Africa into the industrial “global value production chains” that are becoming the hallmark of integrative trade and FDI flows, especially in manufacturing in other regions of the world.
Two quick thoughts: 1) Neither section really relays any novel information, which is quite unforunate; 2) The last sentence of the 'Africa' section really drives the point home, especially for those who cling to hopes that Chinese investment will somehow lead to skills and technology spill-overs, or elevate African firms to the point at which they can become competitive in the global market. Despite their outwardly benevolent statements, the Chinese aren't particularly interested in playing that game.


It's only the beginning, indeed.

Further to Monday's post in which I debunked (successfully or not) myths of China's waning role in, and need for, Africa in the face of the current global economic crisis, the BBC has a brief dossier on China's quest for a broader role in Africa. And if the BBC says it's true, then it really must be true. :) 

Quite possibly the worst job. Ever.

Overseeing the tumultuous American economy is one thing, but serving alongside Mugabe? That definitely wins first prize in the "most undesirable job" category.

Yet Morgan Tsvangirai, Zimbabwe's opposition leader, took the plunge today as he was sworn in as prime minister in a unity government with Mugabe. Not only will he now have the...ummm pleasure?... of ... cooperating? (apologies, I appear to be at a loss for words)... with Mugabe, but is also handed the responsibility of dealing with an economy in ruins, 90% unemployment, and a cholera epidemic which has killed close to 4,000 people. Sounds glamorous, doesn't it?

Now there are some who are optimistic about this newfound partnership, arguing that the power-sharing deal may be the first step in solving the Zimbabwe crisis (or crises, as the case may be). Yet others (myself included) fear that this may in the long-term only discredit Tsvangirai and his party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and do little to engender genuine reform. After all, under the agreement Mugabe retains control of the security and intelligence forces, which have done so well to keep him in power. 

Mmmmm... another fantastic political science experiment in the making.

A man is known by the company he keeps. So is a country.

Earlier this week, China's human rights record came under scrutiny before the U.N. Human Rights Council. As expected, China denied that it censors the news media, maintain hidden prisons, persecutes minorities or gives an excessive number of prisoners the death penalty. This surprised no one.

What's perhaps most interesting, though, is the litany of nations that came forth to congratulate China, and laud its social policies - censorship, death penalty and beyond. From Tim Johnston: 

The Egyptian envoy said "we understand the need of China to keep the death penalty and recognize that in China it is strictly controlled and applied with extreme caution.” He praised the fact that pregnant women and minors are not executed.

Iran congratulated China's "efforts to promote and protect human rights for all" but in referring to the internet added that "its negative impact can never be underestimated.” It encouraged China to tighten censorship to prohibit "defamation of religion" and “pornographic websites.”

Cuba praised China for being an "exceptional country," and urged it to enforce "strict compliance with law. . . to prevent people disguised as human rights activists from trying to destroy the state."  

Singapore said China’s sustained economic growth is little short of a miracle.

Pakistan suggested foreign countries butt out of China’s affairs: “China does not require external advice on securing the rights of its people.”

Sri Lanka said his country “rejects the malign criticisms of China made by the same quarters … who tore China into little pieces during the period of colonialism and … actually forced the habit of opium upon the Chinese people.”

If you're keen to watch the entire three-hour session, you can do so here. 

The beginning of the end of 'China in Africa'? Hardly.

I received an email from a friend yesterday directing me to this publication in the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief, and enquiring as to whether the end of 'China in Africa' (the phenomenon, not the blog!) might be on the horizon. I've opted to respond publicly, as this is not the first time that the question has crossed my desk.

The short answer is: no. 

In the Jamestown piece, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills argue that the commodity price decline has adversely affected African export prices and growth, and subsequently African relations with China. They cite the withdrawal of Chinese entrepreneurs from Zambia and the Congo, and an overall Chinese strategic retreat from the continent, in turn suggesting that the market - and not grand strategy - is the main Chinese motivation in Africa. 

While this may be true to an extent, I fear that Herbst and Mills are overstating their claim. While some Chinese entrepreneurs have migrated out of Africa, Beijing continues to aggressively pursue its African relations, regarding the reality of a now waning West as the ideal opportunity to strengthen its influence across the continent. In the last month alone China has:
  • Signed a $280 million deal with Mauritania to extend the port at Nouakchott 
  • Agreed to build a hospital in Nairobi
  • Offered $77 million to Uganda in a renewed bid to boost the East African country's development
  • Installed government internet in Senegal
  • Signed an aid and cooperation agreement to further ties with Rwanda
  • Signed a 2.6 billion agreement to develop Liberia's iron ore mine, the biggest ever investment in the West African nation
  • Signed another agreement (the Chinese do love their agreements!) with Nigerian Communications Satellite Limited to replace the nation's first communications satellite, which failed in orbit in November 2008
  • Secured a $1 billion loan to Angola
  • And built a national radio and television broadcast building in Congo
What's more, the floundering China-Congo deal Herbst and Mills cite is faltering not because of declining growth and commodity prices, as they suggest, but rather because western donors are threatening to renege on their promises of relief on the country's historic debt of $11bn if the Congo accepts Chinese financing on commercial terms. According to Barney Jopson in today's FT:
The focus of concern, according to western diplomats in Kinshasa, is that the deal would give the Chinese consortium unprecedented state financial guarantees, including some that earmark government revenues and make China a privileged creditor[...]
Trade between China and Africa is at an all time high. Hu Jintao is touring the continent this week, stressing the importance of Sino-African ties and shoring up African good sentiment. Deals continue to be signed. And this is meant to be the end? No, I'm afraid this is only the beginning.