Human Rights Watch data on the crisis in the Congo

Human Rights Watch has released new data on the atrocities being committed in the Congo.  According to the report, at least 90 women have been raped and 180 villagers killed by Rwandan rebels in the past two months alone. Upwards of  250, 000 people have fled the country: 
The Rwandan Hutu militia called the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) attacked and burned dozens of villages and towns in Masisi and Lubero territories (North Kivu) as well as in Kalehe territory (South Kivu) in recent weeks, committing numerous deliberate killings, rapes, and acts of looting. Blaming government military operations, the FDLR deliberately targeted civilians, used them as human shields, and accused civilians of having betrayed them. According to witnesses and victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the FDLR have been implicated in the killings of at least 154 civilians since January 23.
 In the meantime, the Congolese leadership has decided to go ahead with a $9 billion Chinese mining and infrastructure program, which will bring much-needed roads, railways, schools and hospitals to the country. In return, the Chinese are acquiring billions of dollars worth of copper and cobalt reserves needed to feed the country's export-driven economy. It would appear that China hasn't entirely abandoned its 'non-interference' principle just yet.


Chinese shops in Argentina

Via Danwei:
Currently, there are 60,000 to 70,000 Chinese in Argentina. Only about 15,000 to 20,000 of those reportedly identify as Taiwanese. Though the Taiwanese were the first to arrive in Argentina in the 1980s, their population has dwindled in recent years as many left, with a steep drop in numbers occurring after Argentina’s economic crisis of 2001. Meanwhile, the number of mainland Chinese immigrants has proliferated, in step with China’s growing investment in the country and the rest of Latin America.

In Argentina, there are about 4,200 Chinese-run supermarkets and their numbers are growing. A 2008 statistic reported that approximately 14 new Chinese-run supermarkets open up each month.
Chinese shops and supermarkets are an equally prevalent phenomenon across Africa. Such small-scale ventures carry great developmental implications for the continent (both of them), arguably more so than do larger investment projects. While major projects generally bear most heavily on the formal sector, such supermarkets and shops span both the formal and informal sectors, with especially dire implications for informal sector workers who are unable to parry Chinese competition, and have few alternatives for employment and profit. It will certainly be fascinating to examine the varied (or parallel) ways in which similar Chinese strategies impact economic growth and development in Africa and Latin America, respectively.

Mais oui, nous aimons la Chine....

I'm a few days late with this, but found it worth mentioning nevertheless. It would appear that not only is it imperative for Malawians understand the inextricable bond between Tibet and China, but according to the French, it is imperative that all Westerners do as well. Well, maybe. 

At the G20 summit last week, China and France agreed to repair what are no doubt very tattered relations. Several days later, Herve Ladsous, the French ambassador in Beijing, issued a statement in China Daily in which he asserted that Tibet had been a "slave society" before the arrival of Mao's liberators sixty years ago, and that many Westerners "do not know enough about the reality of Tibet" (i.e. that it is an inseparable part of  the Mainland). Hmmmm. Is this what he really meant to say, or was it merely a slip of the tongue? A faux pas, if you will? There doesn't appear to be word of this anywhere else, but Ladsous did dwell on the matter for quite some time. These are rather bold statements to be coming from the mouth of the French. Either this is a brilliant misrepresentation on the part of the Chinese (which wouldn't be too terribly surprising), or the French have again outdone themselves in the department of making nice. 

Chinese propaganda finds its way to Malawi (likely not for the first time...)

Malawi's "Daily Times" newspaper ran a 12-page supplement a few days ago entitled "50 Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet." The spread was allegedly paid for by the Chinese Embassy in Malawi.

There's more information on this in Duffel's blog, Letters from Namitembo, including a bizarre conversation with the newspaper's Advertising Manager and scanned images of the entire 12 pages of propaganda.

I must echo Joshua Keating (and send a hat tip his way, as well), in enquiring as to why Malawians would care so much about Tibet, or, more importantly, why China seems to care so much that they do.  Obviously China places great emphasis on the primacy of its "One China" policy when engaging in bilateral relations with nations (which no doubt includes Tibet as much as it does Taiwan), but a) Malawi has already pledged its allegiance to Beijing, and b) I don't recall Tibet ever being much of an issue as far as Malawi is concerned. So either I'm missing something or this Chinese PR campaign is entirely nonsensical. Thoughts?

North Korea launches missile; China shrugs shoulders

Despite much international pressure to the contrary, North Korea launched a long-range missile this past Sunday. Though perhaps not particularly successful (wasn't it? I'm not so sure...) the launch has managed to stir some excitement (and not the good kind) among the international community, and has likewise lead many an analyst to raise an eyebrow or two over China's rather blasé response (the Chinese merely stated that they "took notice" of the launch, with no further commentary. As per usual, Danwei does a great job summarizing the Chinese headlines on the event).

To be perfectly honest, I don't see what all the huff and puff is about as far as the Chinese response is concerned. Does anyone really expect the Chinese to come forward and condemn North Korea for its actions? China is North Korea's most important ally, main source of food, fuel and arms, and its biggest trade partner. Trade between the two nations has been growing rapidly in recent years which, as the WSJ's China Journal observes:
is funded through credit from Beijing, which fears an influx of North Korean refugees if economic conditions in the isolated, poverty-ridden state worsen.
It should come as no surprise, then, that the Chinese were quick to block any formal U.N. condemnation of the launch, and are not about to make any pronouncements of their own. Moreover, I hesitate to agree with analyses that posit this recent fiasco as evidence of China's waning clout over the regime in Pyongyang. I'd rather be inclined to believe that the Chinese have by now learned the delicate balance between exerting pressure and keeping their lips sealed when it comes to their comrades to the North. It would appear they've opted to pursue the latter strategy this time around.

If Timothy Garton Ash says it's true...

... then it must well be so. Maybe.

In yesterday's Guardian, Ash declares 2 April 2009 as the day on which, "through the catalysis of the global economic crisis, China definitively emerged as a 21st-century world power." This declaration the seemingly inevitable consequence of China's enormous clout at the G20 summit (even the French are now cozying up to China!). The China Post likewise, and not surprisingly, proclaimed the summit as "China's big break" and quite possibly the turning point of the global economy.

Fine. If China is now the new, official world power the subsequent question becomes that of what kind of power will China be? In an attempt to answer this question, Ash poses what he calls the "Chinese question of questions":
can you continue to combine command politics with market economics? Or, to frame it more positively: can you achieve a controlled, step-by-step evolution of this political system into one that is more responsive, transparent, accountable and therefore durable?
Ash then optimistically assumes that China will be able to remedy its domestic challenges, command politics and all, and will continue to rise to that coveted  #1 spot. Yet he never quite arrives at a response identifying the type of power China might become, likely because he's not asking the appropriate questions. John Pomfret does a brilliant job dissecting precisely this point:
But what if he's asked the wrong question? What if the burning question for China is, for example, demographics? It's the fastest aging society in the world. It will indeed grow old before it gets rich. Or what if the question is environmental? I don't need to go into details here, you know how bad it is. Or social? China's crime problem is serious and getting worse. There's a nationwide shortage of trust. Or health-related? AIDS continues to grow; there's avian flu. Or economic? Yes, China has done miraculously so far. But exports are down significantly. Can they weather this Western-induced crisis?

There is a triumphalism coming from Beijing that Garton Ash's piece notes. The recent attack on the dollar; the obnoxious musings of Vice President and Anointed Successor Xi Junping while he was in Mexico. Some of the bluster is justified. But some of it also masks a deep insecurity about what's next for China. We need to remember that what we often think are the big questions for that great country aren't the right ones at all.
As China continues its inevitable rise, it is crucial for Western scholars to think outside the box in analyses of this growing world power. The oft employed Western paradigm of economy+military+political system only takes us so far in understanding the what, and why and how when it comes to China. There is,  in other words, no clear formulaic approach to this emerging economy. So to that end, Timothy Garton Ash may be right. Or not. 

China continues to extend its reach into Latin America, world, etc.

Before the much hyped up and protested G20 summit, occurred a more low-key gathering held among members of the Inter-American Development Bank, which ended this Tuesday. To the surprise of no one, the Chinese, and especially Zhou Xiaochuan, the head of China's central bank, seemingly ran the show. How is this possible, you may ask? China became an official member of the Inter-American Development Bank in January 2009, and has been making its presence known ever since.

At this most recent IDB meeting, China agreed to a $10.24 billion currency swap with Argentina, a country whose bonds could be worth next to nothing by 2010. While China has done similar swaps with other countries, this is its first such deal with a Latin American state. So why now? And why with Argentina? 

Writing in FP Passport, Andrew Polk posits two reasons - the first, straightforward, the second "disturbing":

First, as Xinhua reports, the Argentines can essentially use the RMB as extra cash to pay for imports. But one might note that, since the Yuan is not a convertible currency, the money can only be used to purchase goods from -- you guessed it -- China, potentially giving a boost the Dragon's ailing export sector.


The other reason for the swap seems more strategic, especially in conjunction with other currency trades that China has very quietly signed with Malaysia, Hong Kong, South Korea, Belarus, and Indonesia over the past three months. As the Financial Times puts it: 

Economists...see Beijing's currency swap deals as pieces in a jigsaw designed to promote wider international use of the renminbi, starting with making it more acceptable for trade and aiming at establishing it as a reserve currency in Asia, something that would also enhance China's political clout."

To this Tom Pellman, writing in his brilliant blog Double Handshake: China and Latin America (which I highly recommend! Tom has some great insights into the growing Sino-Latin American relationship) adds:

Argentina’s central bank president, Martin Redrado, was quick to point out that the deal is a contingency plan; the country doesn’t need it at the moment. And, another asterisk behind the deal:

“The fact that China represents such a small share of Argentina’s total trade (less than 12 percent) suggests limited impact on FX, but is an important political gimmick at this time (convertibility will remain an issue),” RBS wrote in a research note issued on Tuesday.

Gimmick or no, Zhou proved that even in an international setting like the IDB summit, China will look for ways to extend its reach (and currency priorities).

I couldn't have said it better myself. 

Youth Forum on China-Africa Relations at Yale

Yale University is hosting a three-day conference held from 24 - 26 April to discuss the bourgeoning relationship between China and Africa. According to the YFOCAR website, the conference will bring African, Chinese and other delegates to New Haven for a full schedule of events including panels, keynote addresses, discussion seminars, and debates. These events will seek to create an open dialogue to strengthen cross-cultural ties, encourage mutual understanding, and set the stage for long-standing respect between China and the African continent. 

Yours truly has been invited to contribute to a panel on economic development in a Sino-African context, which will take place on the last day of the conference, 26 April. Should any China in Africa readers be in and around the New Haven area then, it would be wonderful to make your acquaintance!

Registration for the conference is available on the YFOCAR website (see here). Attendees must complete their registration by 5pm on Sunday, 5 April. Yale will be provided all guests with accommodation and two meals per day.

An overstated withdrawal

The New York Times ran a story last week touting the steady decline of Chinese investment across the African continent:

As global commodity prices have plummeted and several of China's African partners have stumbled deeper into chaos, China has backed away from some of its riskiest and most aggressive plans, looking for the same guarantees that Western companies have long sought for their investments: economic and political stability.

Though I've touched on this issue before, it appears that it is one worth returning to. While the economic crisis has, indeed, adversely affected Chinese exports and subsequently many key African sectors, this does not spell doom for the continent anymore than it signals a mass withdrawal of Chinese investments, as the NYTimes appears to suggest.


The most recent issue of Africa-Asia Confidential does an especially brilliant job of driving this point home:

Anecdotal evidence suggests that some firms could be trying to shift unwanted goods to new markets in Africa. That might mean more choice and lower prices for African consumers. 'We don't see so many African traders coming in as before but demand for Chinese corporations is extraordinary. We see so many Chinese merchants and small companies sending people to Africa, many for the first time,' said Lily Tang, China Manager for Kenya Airways, which flies from Guangzhou to the continent.

Indeed, while some Chinese companies might be fleeing, the general trend is seemingly one of firm restructuring. China is continuing to invest in natural resource sectors across the continent, with projects picking up now that the weather is improving. Small-scale entrepreneurs are likewise continuing to pursue independent ventures in states across the region, peddling cheap goods in African markets. Though we may be witnessing a slowdown in such trends, it is hardly the end of 'China in Africa,' as such.


An additional point worth mentioning, one initially observed by Africa Works, is that the NYTimes story is based solely on the country of Guinea:

a country that has little going for it economically or socially. In more robust countries such as Kenya, Ghana and Zambia, Chinese investment is part of a mix of foreign capital. With growing cities, many African countries represent a rare opportunity to take advantage of new consumer demand.

It will, of course, be curious to observe how things unfold as the economic crisis progresses, but for the time being there really is no need for dramatic tales of complete Chinese withdrawal. Really.


[Photo credit: NYTimes]


The secret behind China's global rise, #45870458

Ignorant American politicians who are incapable of intelligently engaging in timely and necessary debates.

Via Trade Diversion, Jonathan Dingel writes:

Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann is clueless about the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. In fact, it seems she’s clueless about what a reserve currency is. That’s why, in reaction to China’s SDR proposal, she’s introducing legislation to “bar the dollar from being replaced by any foreign currency.” And apparently a lot of people are similarly confused and need a quick explanation of the difference between legal tender and currency reserves.

If Rep. Bachmann’s office needs some assistance with international economics, I’d be happy to provide some advice over the phone at a reasonable price.

Having had my fair share of economic discussions with Jonathan, I can readily vouch for his expertise.

Having had their fair share of international gaffes in recent weeks, too (see here and here, for instance), I would urge U.S. politicians to do engage in greater background research before making future pronouncements (pertaining to anything, really) or attempting gestures of goodwill. Unfortunately, things in this department do not appear especially promising: standing in front of the Basilica of Our Lady of Guadalupe, which was "miraculously imprinted by Mary on the tilma, or cloak, or Juan Diego in 1531," Hilary Clinton on her recent trip to Mexico turned to the priest who was showing her the Basilica and asked, "Who painted it?"

Quite frankly I don't know how anyone is to take the U.S. seriously if such blunders continue to be made. Of course such slips of the tongue occur frequently in the wonderful world that is international relations, but one would hope that politicians in the world's superpower would be sufficiently knowledgeable on what really are commonplace matters. Even I understand the difference between legal tender and currency reserves, and I will be the first to admit that economics is not my forte.

While on the surface such slips may not appear to be a big deal, they do go a long way in discrediting the United States in the global arena, and are likewise utilized by leaders in countries who are interested in asserting their superiority over (or equality to) the U.S. in doing precisely that. China is no exception.

[HT: Andrew Sullivan]

One China, indeed

It really is amazing, isn't it: you step away for a few days and the world seemingly shifts beneath you. Having returned from what was a beautiful wedding in Nashville, I sat down this morning for my daily perusal of the news to discover that the Chinese are running a cyber spying ring (this is admittedly not at all surprising); Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills are arguing that the DRC does not exist; having refused the entry of the Dalai Lama, South Africa is now awarding Fidel Castro the country's highest honor; El Salvador is switching its diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China; the United States is becoming the new China; and, as if such news wasn't sufficiently overwhelming, it would appear that things are looking up in Zimbabwe. My goodness!

There's a unifying theme underlying at least two of these stories, which is worth teasing out in greater detail. With China now prominent on the global stage, attention tends to focus primarily on its economic and military activities (a very Western paradigm through which to examine international relations), often failing to account for the continued centrality of the "One China" policy in Beijing's dealings with the world. The recent happenings in El Salvador and South Africa are cases in point. Writing on South Africa's decision, the CS Monitor's Scott Baldauf notes:
A nation that freed itself from an apartheid government, South Africa would seem to have much in common with leading liberation figures like the Dalai Lama, who speaks for about 5.4 million Tibetans, who live under Chinese rule.

But as a nation that depends heavily on Chinese markets for buying its rich natural resources, South Africa has given the appearance of having chosen commerce over principle. It's a decision that could cost South Africa its moral voice on the global stage.

Todd Moss, quoting Nelson Mandela's grandson, organizer of the peace conference which was to host the Dalai Lama, observes:

This rejection by the government, to not issue a visa, is really tainting our efforts at democracy. It’s a sad day for South Africa. It’s a sad day for Africa…Where are we heading in the future?

Straight into the open arms of the Chinese, I would argue. Indeed, they must be quite pleased with themselves in Beijing, what with a growing number of countries wrapped around their finger - in Africa and beyond. While many countries are quick to pledge their allegiance to the Chinese for purely economic purposes, in some cases the reasoning is rooted in greater historical motivations, as appears to be the case in El Salvador:

The FMLN has never forgotten that ARENA founder Roberto D'Aubuisson, who organized and led the death squads which tortured and killed thousands of civilians and who directly ordered the assassination of Archbishop of San Salvador Monsignor Oscar Romero on March 24, 1980 that sparked the civil war, was trained in "police techniques" in Taiwan.
Moreover, unlike Nicaragua, Guatemala or Paraguay, Taiwan has been unable to develop solid political dialogue with the FMLN even under DPP President Chen Shui-bian.

Dual recognition appears to be out of the question for El Salvador, handing another diplomatic win (of sorts) to the Chinese. Indeed, it's important to recall that for the leaders in Beijing, national unity is of utmost importance, second only to economic growth. And for developing countries struggling to sustain their growth rates in the face of an ongoing economic crisis, acknowledging Chinese national integrity is a small price to pay for the goods handed in return. While scholars and policymakers alike sometimes tend to bypass the centrality of the "One China" principle, it remains a central tenet of Chinese foreign policy, not to be overlooked. 

As for South Africa awarding Castro the Order of Companions of O.R. Tambo in Gold award... your guess is as good as mine.

A(nother) brief time out

China in Africa is taking another little breather from now until Monday, as yours truly will be spending the next several days in Music City, USA, fulfilling time-honored bridesmaid duties. I promise to return refreshed and rejuvenated, and likely with many gush-worthy stories to share (and continued insights on China and Africa, of course!)

Have a wonderful weekend!

How China sees the world: A lesson from The Economist

The most recent cover of The Economist has caught the attention of cartographers (self-proclaimed and otherwise) and Chinese scholars (ditto) alike. Falling more squarely into the former category (though without the self-proclaimed epithet), the folks over at Strange Maps offer an interesting analysis of the depiction: 

In the ocean immediately beyond the city are a few islands of particular interest to China:

  • Japan: the old rival, whose rapid modernisation preceded China’s, but now eclipsed and reduced to a few harmless islands.
  • Taiwan: similarly superseded by China’s massive economic progress, but still relevant as the rival claimant to be China’s ‘legitimate’ government. Even more repulsive to mainland China is a competing strand of current Taiwanese politics, striving for ‘independence’ and thus eschewing the ‘One China’ policy still officially espoused by both the communist mainland and nationalist Taiwan.
  • Hong Kong: the former British crown colony that was handed back to China in 1997 and which has been allowed a degree of autonomy unthinkable elsewhere in China (e.g. Tibet) under an agreement often referred to as ‘One Country, Two Systems’, whereby Hong Kong was allowed to retain its capitalist system and its civil liberties, including inchoate democratic institutions.
  • Spratly Islands: a sprawling archipelago of over 600 islets, atols and reefs in the South China Sea, between Vietnam and the Philippines, with barely 5 square kilometers of dry land between them. Because of their strategic location, the Spratlys, or parts of them, are claimed and partly occupied by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia - and as such are a flashpoint waiting to happen.

Across a narrow representation of the Pacific Ocean lies the continent apparently most on China’s mind - America. And especially, apart from a tiny slice labelled Canada and a small appendage being dug up for minerals called South America, the United States. The US is a crumbling empire, with the Statue of Liberty clutching a begging bowl and holding up a sign saying: Please give generously. Next to some shacks is a sign saying Foreclosure Sale (a reference to the house repossessions that are symptomatic of the credit crunch which triggered the present economic recession). Wall Street is a fault almost splitting the US in two.


Europe is much smaller and more irrelevant than America, in the ocean beyond it. All that distinguishes it are Prada and Hermes, two brands of luxury fashion accessories, and presumably very popular with the wealthy Chinese elite - suggesting that Europe is only interesting to China as a glorified shopping mall. 


Next to Europe is Africa, equally distant from China, but at least decked out with some of the implements of industry, referring to the large investments China is making in Africa, benefiting the poorest continent with new infrastructure and providing China with access to much-needed raw materials for its burgeoning industry.

Visibly missing from the "map" are the Middle East (with especial attention paid to Iran) and a demarcation of Russia, both of which are vital Chinese allies. The Economist especially should be aware that much of China's world view is informed by its need for natural resources, predominant among them oil, for which both the M.E. and Russia are essential. Alas, I'm willing to forgive this wonderful publication for such a glaring oversight (this time). 

With somewhat of a different conundrum, however, is Will Lewis of Experience Not Logic - a brilliant China law blog - who asks whether the Economist cover might possibly infringe on copyright law. He draws on the important copyright dispute in Steinberg v. Columbia and offers up a most interesting discussion. If you look closely, the cover even alludes to this very case: the sign above the Imperial Palace reads: "With apologies to Steinberg and the New Yorker." Who would have thought that one can learn so much without even opening The Economist?! Sheer brilliance, I say. 

Human rights through your local church

At least that's the idea in Rwanda, where President Paul Kagame is seeking to mobilize Rwandan pastors to protect human rights and pursue forgiveness. Kagame has even teamed up with Rick Warren of Saddleback Church to develop a five-to-seven year project aimed at attaining precisely these objectives. Via Opinio Juris Roger Alford writes:

I have spent the last two weeks working with a team of Saddleback lawyers who are implementing this impressive program. Having met with Supreme Court and High Court judges, Ministry of Justice officials, and over sixty of the top Rwandan pastors in the country, I am convinced that in a country where 82 percent of the population are Christians, there is no better vehicle for educating the general populace about human rights than the local church. At the invitation of President Kagame, Saddleback Church has been sending hundreds of volunteer professionals–doctors, nurses, lawyers, psychologists, etc.–to work with local churches to address Rwanda’s most pressing problems.


On the legal front, top government officials have identified three central problems: intra-family land grabbing, domestic violence, and sexual crimes. To address those problems, lawyers from Saddleback Church have drafted a human rights manual for local pastors they can use to educate their members about those issues. They have started with the issue of land grabbing, and future manuals will be developed that focus on domestic violence and sexual crimes.


[...] It is an impressive project. The result will be a manual that will be sent to thousands of Rwandan pastors with information on the rights of women and children and information on legal resources for families who struggle with land grabbing. Prevention is the principal objective, but for those who are in the midst of a land grabbing dispute, the manual encourages local pastors to work with government legal aid clinics, the National University of Rwanda, and the Christian human rights NGO International Justice Mission to intervene.

Time Magazine also ran a story on this back in 2005 which can be found here.

Smart power in U.S-China (and Africa) relations

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has released a report entitled 'Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States,' which argues against zero-sum analyses of China's activities on the global stage (that is, perceiving China as either healthy competition or a strategic threat) and for increased U.S-China cooperation in the developing world. After taking stock of China and America's global soft power initiatives, the report concludes that:
The United States can do more to collaborate with China in the developing world, particularly in the areas of energy, health, agriculture, and peacekeeping. If such collaboration were to take place, the United States and China would find themselves working toward a greater global public good.
Perhaps of particular interest to readers of this blog will be the chapter on 'China's Soft Power in Africa,' written by Jennifer Cooke. Though much of Cooke's analysis has now been relegated to mere common knowledge (e.g. the Chinese are foremost interested in access to resources; much of China's loan money is given in the form of concessional loans; the Chinese government emphasizes the 'win-win' nature of Sino-African partnerships, etc.), she does an interesting job of comparing Chinese engagements in the continent with current U.S. engagements.

Of particular note is her observation that while U.S. soft-power programs in Africa have increased, the U.S. still exerts considerable hard power across the continent which, coupled with the stigma often borne by Western humanitarian assistance, often hinders the advancement of effective energy, health, agriculture and other development programs. For this reason (as well as several others which I won't go into - read the report!), Cooke concludes that there are areas in which the U.S. should emulate China's approach to Africa, and likewise sufficient common ground between the states so as to engender effective cooperation. Hers is an interesting and refreshing perspective few have yet been willing to offer. I'm not certain how likely such cooperation may be in the short-term, but it certainly is an objective to work towards going forward as it may, indeed, bring about the positive developments Africa needs. 

But enough of my rambling. Read the report and let me know what you think.

Sustainable fashion (and a congratulations!)





I absolutely have to take this opportunity to congratulate fellow 2006 Northwestern alum, Jessa Brinkmeyer, for her recent 2009 Green Award presented by Chicago Mag! Jessa is an avid environmentalist and the owner of a fabulous boutique, Pivot - Chicago's first boutique devoted to eco-fashion. Should you ever find yourself in the area, do pay her a visit (1101 W. Fulton, Chicago) and congratulate her for a job well done (oh, and purchase a thing or two as well!....).

Marking their territory

I initially refrained from commenting on the US-China naval spat in the South China Sea earlier this month, assuming that it was perhaps a one-off misstep; a faux pas, if you will. These things happen, right? Well, yes, but it would appear that the incident is part and parcel of China's broader attempts to assert itself in the South China Sea or, as James Kraska writes, a careful and deliberate attempt to promote "a vision that de-legitimizes the forward presence of the U.S. Navy in the region." This warrants some commentary.

The FT today reports that China is sending even more navy patrols to the South China Sea, seeking to extend its reach over the disputed Spratly Islands (disputed insofar as they are claimed in full (!) by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei). The Chinese have indeed become more aggressive and forward-looking than they were several years ago, both in terms of their hard and soft power strategies. Such activity begs two key questions: first, with respect to the incident in particular, who or at what level in the Chinese government was the incident (de facto harassment) ordered?; and second, with respect to China flexing its naval muscles, what is an appropriate U.S. response?

Gordan Chang writing in RealClearWorld (the global edition of RealClearPolitics) certainly seems to have some thoughts:
Analysts speculate as to Chinese intentions, but in a sense it really does not matter what Beijing is trying to accomplish. Its conduct is simply unacceptable. Washington, however, seeks to establish “dialogue” with China’s generals, admirals, and officials as if their belligerent acts are the result of the lack of contact. It is simply ludicrous for the Obama White House to claim that the Chinese want to “strengthen cooperation” or build a “positive and constructive” relationship after engaging in such truculent behavior.

And it is wrong to suggest that incidents can be avoided in the future if we only increase the level of communication or its frequency. We have had formal and informal military relations with China for decades, and now there is even a brand new mil-to-mil hotline connecting the United States to China. So it is an attack on common sense for the Pentagon to claim that “face-to-face dialogue in Beijing and in Washington will go a long way to clearing up any misunderstanding about this incident.” The problem is not that we don’t talk to the Chinese enough or that we misunderstand them. It is that they are hostile.

The hostile Chinese? David Axe doesn't appear to think so:

To be clear, Beijing and Washington are not enemies, Robert Kaplan stressed in a recent article for Foreign Affairs. Rather, China is a "legitimate peer competitor" of the United States. The task of the U.S. Navy will therefore be to quietly leverage the sea power of its closest allies -- India in the Indian Ocean and Japan in the western Pacific -- to set limits on China's expansion.

One would be hard-pressed to deny China as a "legitimate peer competitor," yet I would argue that some of this legitimacy is lost when harassment is adopted as a strategic tactic. There is nothing wrong with a state wanting to mark its territory; it is the fashion by which it goes about doing so, however, that sets the tone. As the old adage goes, actions speak louder than words.